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This thesis contributes to the recent work on “export sophistication” in 
international political economy and economic growth. The central question 
that I address is what determines a country’s level of export sophistication. To 
answer this question, I explore the role of state-society relations and political 
institutions – in addition to economic fundamentals – in influencing the level 
of sophistication. I argue that a synergetic relationship between state and 
society positively contributes to the level of export sophistication. However, 
this relationship holds only after the level of state-society synergy reaches 
some threshold. This threshold effect of synergy is formally derived from a 
simultaneous game with incomplete information.  
The central hypothesis is tested using time series cross sectional data. 
The key novelty in the empirical part of my research is the construction of a 
“synergy index” that allows for cross-country comparison and is based on 
Peter Evans’ conceptualization of the term. Overall, the data suggests that 
state-society synergy favors export sophistication in countries with above-
threshold levels of synergy. This relationship is particularly robust in the 
subsample of (upper) middle income countries. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that state-society synergy has a stronger effect on export sophistication in 
countries with a higher human capital stock and higher net inflows of foreign 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
Over the past half-century, globalization has brought about a significant 
rise in the volume of international trade. According to the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (commonly known as the HS 
System), more than 200,000 commodities are traded internationally today. In 
2006, the value of global trade in goods and services passed 15 trillion US 
dollars and trade in goods accounts for 83% of the total flow (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2009). Furthermore, with the exception of a few years, “trade has 
grown more rapidly than output each year since 1950” (p. 8), resulting in 
higher trade-GDP ratios indicating greater openness to trade across the globe.  
While a lot has been written on trade openness and its causes and 
effects, 1  some of the more recent literature has focused on the type of 
commodities being traded. We observe that many developing countries that 
used to export agricultural and natural resource products are now producers 
and traders of manufactured goods. Hoekman and Kostecki (2009) report that 
“the share of manufactures in total exports of developing countries increased 
from 30% in 1980 to about 70% in 2005” (p. 11). In other words, the leap in 
trade liberalization is accompanied by changes in the contents of countries’ 
export baskets.  
Why is what a country exports important? The answer, in a nutshell, is 
that it matters for growth. While the overall relationship between trade 
openness and growth is ambiguous at best, we know that “not all goods are 
                                                            
1  For instance, Milner and Kubota (2005) and Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002) 
discuss the effect of democracy on trade openness and liberalization. Alcala and Ciccone 
(2004) and Frankel and Romer (1999) examine the relationship between trade, productivity, 
and growth.  
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alike in terms of their consequences for economic performance and 
specializing in some products will bring higher growth than specializing in 
others” (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007, p. 1). Political scientists are 
particularly interested in growth because nearly all governments in the world 
need to take economic growth seriously. In democracies, economic 
performance is essential to winning elections and access to political power. In 
countries governed by non-democratic regimes, economic growth is often an 
important source of political legitimacy that justifies authoritarian rule.  
The current research builds on the idea of “export sophistication” which 
appeared in recent works of international political economy and economic 
growth (Lall, Weiss and Zhang, 2006; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007). 
Simply put, export sophistication of a country is a measure of the overall 
characteristics of the country’s export products. The key innovation of this 
measure is that product characteristics are inferred from characteristics of the 
exporting countries rather than industry-level data. A product is considered 
more sophisticated if its exporters have a higher average GDP per capita. A 
country would score higher in terms of export sophistication if its export 
basket contains more sophisticated products.  
The central question that I address in this research is what determines a 
country’s level of export sophistication. To answer this question, I explore the 
role of state-society relations and political institutions – in addition to 
economic fundamentals – in influencing the sophistication level. I argue that a 
synergetic form of relationship between state and society positively 
contributes to the level of export sophistication, but that this relationship only 
holds after the level of state-society synergy reaches a certain threshold. State-
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society synergy refers to the underlying potential, which, once activated, 
enables genuine state-society cooperation. Such a potential is conditioned by 
the level of embeddedness, state strength, political competition, and degree of 
egalitarianism.  
As mentioned earlier, this research goes beyond economic fundamentals 
in explaining cross-country variations in export sophistication. Though state-
society synergy is not an entirely new concept, I make an empirical 
contribution by quantifying this concept through the construction of a 
“synergy index”, which is based on the abovementioned definition and allows 
for large-n comparison across countries and statistical analysis. The theoretical 
framework of my thesis also bridges two bodies of literature that could 
potentially complement each other but individually have limitations. On the 
one hand, a subdivision of the development literature emphasizes the role of 
government as a coordinator and supporter of the private sectors, but takes this 
role of government for granted. It does not answer under what conditions a 
government can successfully play such as role. On the other hand, while the 
state-society relation literature that gives birth to state-society synergy may 
offer some clues, these macro-theories generally lack micro-foundations. Thus, 
this thesis addresses an important question unanswered by the development 
literature and provides a micro-foundation to the macro theories of the state-
society relations. It highlights that state-society synergy needs to exceed a 
certain threshold to enable state-business cooperation. Furthermore, such 
cooperation is reached by the rational decisions of state officials and 
entrepreneurs based on cost-benefit analysis. Investments due to state coercion 
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or nationalist mobilization are not considered genuine cooperation under the 
current framework. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literatures and positions the current research in the existing literature. Next, I 
develop my theoretical argument and hypothesis in Chapter 3. I ask three 
questions -- what is state-society synergy, why could state-business 
cooperation improve the productivity of exporting firms, and how can such 
cooperation occur – and present a game-theoretic model that formally explains 
the synergy condition that gives rise to state-business cooperation. Chapter 4 
explains the construction of the synergy index and empirically tests the 





Chapter 2  Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews three bodies of literature related to the current research. I 
first focus on the narrower topic of export sophistication and its determinants. 
Recognizing that this topic is nested within the broader development literature, 
I next turn my attention to the works that emphasize the role of government in 
fostering economic development. Finally I present a few political science 
classics that give rise to the notion of state-society synergy. This research 
contributes to the first body of literature by adding state-society synergy as a 
determinant of export sophistication. It also addresses a general limitation of 
the development literature, which emphasizes cooperation between state and 
private actors but does not answer under what conditions such an arrangement 
can be realized. Last but not least, the game-theoretic model in Chapter 3 
complements the macro-theories of state-society relations with a micro-
foundation.  
 
2.1 Export Sophistication and Its Determinants 
Export sophistication is a relatively new concept in international trade, but the 
underlying idea is rather simple. It captures nothing but a country’s overall 
export basket, or what a country exports.  People may struggle to understand 
the concept largely because the measurement is somewhat novel. 
Conventionally, products entering the international market are classified by 
either factor intensity or technological intensity (Lall, Weiss and Zhang, 2006). 
However, with ever increasing range of products being traded worldwide, “a 
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basic problem with both approaches stems from the relatively high level of 
aggregation at which both can be applied” (Lall, Weiss and Zhang, 2006, p. 
222). These two methods of product characterization do not allow researchers 
to utilize trade data that are available at disaggregated levels such as those 
provided by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). To 
address this issue, Lall, Weiss and Zhang (2006) put forward a new method of 
classifying exports that “does not require industry data, but only information 
on exports of each product and per-capita incomes of exporting countries” (p. 
223) and term it “sophistication index”.  
The sophistication index represents a big conceptual move in the 
understanding of export characteristics. The “sophistication” of export 
captures product characteristics inferred from exporting countries rather than 
industries. A useful analogy to illustrate the idea would be that employers 
often infer the quality of job applicants from the universities that have 
produced them rather than their majors. For example, a Harvard graduate is 
generally believed to be more capable than a graduate of some community 
college, not only because of the quality of courses, but also exposure to novel 
ideas in non-academic settings, quality of peer group and etc. In the same way, 
the index does not only capture the level of technology associated with a 
particular product, but takes on various dimensions that include but are not 
limited to “transport costs, natural resource availability, marketing, 
infrastructure quality and the degree of fragmentability of production” (Lall, 
Weiss and Zhang, 2006, p. 223). In fact, sophistication correlates relatively 
poorly with technology in particular due to fragmentation (p. 235).  
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The technical details of the “sophistication index” are provided in a 
later section on measurement. I shall simply name several “most sophisticated” 
and “least sophisticated” products here to illustrate the idea of sophistication. 
Lall, Weiss and Zhang (2006) divide the world’s export commodities into six 
levels based on their levels of sophistication. Level 1 includes “the most 
sophisticated and technology intensive products such as arms and armored 
fighting vehicles, precision instruments, aircraft, auto engines and 
pharmaceuticals” (p. 226). Level 6 consists of “the least sophisticated products 
like textile, footwear, travel goods, toys, as well as resource-based products 
which only poor countries produce” (p. 226-7). However, sophistication is not 
equivalent to technological content of the products. Chocolates, for example, 
are Level-1 products not because of high technology but the significance of 
marketing and specialized skills. It may also reflect the fact that developed 
countries like Belgium are extremely efficient in producing chocolates. On the 
contrary, high technology, R&D intensive electronic products such as 
semiconductors only belong to the medium sophistication group as a result of 
production fragmentation. Over time, not only the final assembly but also the 
core component manufacturing of semiconductors has been transferred to low-
income countries, primarily in East Asia (Lall, Weiss and Zhang, 2006, p. 
227). According to the sophistication index for year 2000, countries with the 
most sophisticated export baskets include the United States, Japan, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Finland. Singapore leads the developing 
world in 2000 in terms of export sophistication. Explicitly put, a country is 
considered a more sophisticated exporter if its export basket is more similar to 
those of rich countries. Implicitly, what the sophistication index really 
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measures is the overall productivity level of a country’s export sector. For this 
reason, “sophistication” and “productivity” are used interchangeably in later 
chapters of the thesis.  
What, then, is the significance of this new concept and measure? 
According to Lall, Weiss and Zhang (2006), “the rationale of the 
sophistication measure is simply that in the absence of trade interventions, 
products exported by richer countries will have characteristics that allow high 
wage producers to compete in world markets” (p. 223). From a development 
perspective, Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) highlight that “not all 
goods are alike in terms of their consequences for economic performance and 
specializing in some products will bring higher growth than specializing in 
others” (p. 1). The authors construct an index (named EXPY) similar to the 
“sophistication index” put forward by Lall, Weiss and Zhang (2006) and 
empirically demonstrate that the sophistication of a country’s export matters to 
economic growth and this relationship is particularly robust for lower-middle 
income countries. In other words, international trade provides low-income 
countries with a growth engine if these countries can export “rich country 
products”.  
This conclusion begs an interesting question: What determines a 
country’s level of export sophistication? Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) 
have shown that EXPY is positively associated with a few economic 
fundamentals such as per-capita income, human capital and country size. 
However, even after controlling for these economic fundamentals, “a lot 
remains unexplained in the determination of EXPY and there are big outliers 
in either direction, especially among low-income countries” (Hausmann, 
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Hwang and Rodrik, 2007, p. 16). This empirical puzzle leads the authors to 
believe that new industries often arise for “idiosyncratic reasons” and 
economic fundamentals are only part of the story (p. 18).  
So far, the determinants of export sophistication have not been 
systematically studied in a cross-country context. Spearheaded by Rodrik’s 
(2006a) article “What’s So Special about China’s Exports”, most studies 
utilizing the concept of export sophistication have focused on China’s case. 
China is identified by many scholars as an outlier in this connection as it has 
ended up with an export basket that is significantly more sophisticated than 
what would be expected (Rodrik, 2006a, p. 16; Schott, 2008; Wang and Wei, 
2010). While whether Chinese exports are really so special is a controversial 
issue (see for example Yao, 2009; Xu, 2010 for counterarguments), almost all 
scholars studying China’s case have relied on one or more of the following 
factors to explain China’s export sophistication: processing trade, foreign 
direct investment, human capital and government policy. The results have 
been mixed so far except for government policy. As Rodrik (2006a) highlights, 
“China has benefited from both good fundamentals and from a determined 
government effort to acquire domestic capabilities and to build a modern 
industry” (p. 15). Moreover, it seems that the Chinese state has the capacity to 
achieve this goal and “it is possible that the importance of the weaknesses of 
the Chinese bureaucratic model is exaggerated” (p. 15). Similarly, Wang and 
Wei (2010) argue that central and local governments may have used high-tech 
zones and industrial parks to induce firms to upgrade their product ladder to a 
higher level. Last but not least, both Rodrik (2006a) and Jarreau and Poncet 
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(2012) show that rising sophistication of Chinese products has been the 
driving force for the country’s rapid growth.  
If export sophistication indeed promotes growth and is meaningful to 
developing countries, researchers may find it necessary to identify and account 
for the factors that influence its level. For political scientists, the role played 
by government policy is particularly interesting. If China’s case could provide 
us with some generalizable hypothesis, it would be that prudent government 
policy is associated with higher export sophistication. However, on a causal 
level, policy alone is unlikely to be the root cause of higher productivity of the 
export sector. In some cases, government policy simply does not work and in 
other cases, makes things even worse. It is the duty of political scientists to 
find out in what way and under what conditions does government policy give 
rise to higher export sophistication. The evidence presented by Hausmann, 
Hwang and Rodrik (2007) and various studies on China’s case suggest that to 
better explain the cross-country variations in export sophistication, we need to 
move beyond the fundamentalist worldview. Of course, this does not mean 
that economic fundamentals are unimportant. Good economic fundamentals, 
however, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rise of new 
industries and more sophisticated products. Some non-economic factors – 
social or political ones for instance - are likely to be as important as economic 
fundamentals for economic restructuring.  
This thesis represents a modest attempt in this direction. By establishing 
causality between state-society synergy and the productivity of the export 
sector, the current research contributes to the existing literature on the 
determinants of export sophistication. However, the contribution would be 
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limited in its significance if it only addressed this narrow body of literature of 
export sophistication. In a broader context, this paper’s theoretical framework 
adequately speaks to the development literature that emphasizes 
complementarity and the role of government as a coordinator.  
 
2.2 The Role of Government in Development 
In the 1990s, as the economic reforms in developing countries based on the 
Washington Consensus did not “quite work out the way they were intended” 
(Rodrik, 2006b, p. 974), a new generation of development theories gained 
greater influence by providing an alternative view of the conditions required to 
initialize development. These theories in general propose the idea of 
complementarity and argue that several conditions need to be met 
simultaneously for development to take place. Todaro and Smith (2009) 
summarize the common features of these theories as follows: 
“These theories often highlight the problem that several things 
must work well enough, at the same time, to get sustainable 
development under way. They also stress that in many important 
situations, investment must be undertaken by many agents in order 
for the results to be profitable for any individual agent. Generally, 
when complementarities are present, an action taken by one firm, 
worker, or organization increases the incentives for other agents 
to take similar actions” (p. 159).  
 
As we can see, the coordination problem arises because action taken by 
one agent generates some positive externality for other agents. Development 
cannot be initiated until a larger number of agents take similar actions and 
generate sufficient amount of externality. This idea has inspired many works 
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that adopt the “threshold externality” approach.2 Rodrik’s (1996) model of 
coordination failure, which forms part of the current theoretical framework, 
argues that the externality comes from production of intermediate goods. 
According to this model, a sufficient number of intermediate goods need to be 
supplied before production of the high-tech sector becomes viable. The policy 
implication of the abovementioned works is that government needs to act as a 
coordinator of various private sectors to create the complementarity necessary 
for initialization of development. 
The role of government is by no means limited to that of a coordinator. 
When it comes to structural upgrading and product innovation, government 
needs to act as an active supporter of private firms.  For example, the model 
constructed by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) attributes the lack of innovation 
to inadequate inducement for entrepreneurs to discover costs in new activities 
rather than inadequate property rights or lack of access to advanced 
technologies. For policy prescription, the authors highlight that “learning what 
one is good at producing is an important determinant of structural change, but 
it is also one that is unlikely to be adequately provided under laissez-faire” (p. 
628). Therefore, the key policy recommendation is that “laissez-faire leads to 
underprovision of innovation and governments need to play a dual role in 
fostering industrial growth and transformation” (p. 629). 3 
                                                            
2 For example, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) assume that the externality is due to increasing 
social return to accumulation of human capital; Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) see the 
substitution of factors in the production of final consumer goods as a source of externality for 
other producers of intermediate goods; Rodriguez-Clare (1996) argues that externality is 
derived from the requirements of specialized inputs.  
 
3 For a more detailed discussion on policy issues based on this argument, see Rodrik (2007), 
Chapter 4, “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-first Century”.  
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This body of literature has undoubtedly contributed to our understanding 
of the conditions required for development and the necessity of government in 
the process. However, most of the works adopting this approach speak from an 
economic perspective and assume the role of government to be exogenous. It 
would be difficult to believe that by highlighting the role of government as a 
coordinator or supporter, these authors are trying to undermine the importance 
of private businesses. Instead, what they are really arguing for is some kind of 
mutuality and cooperation between state and businesses. As Rodrik (2007) 
comments, “it is increasingly recognized that developing societies need to 
embed private initiative in a framework of public action that encourages 
restructuring, diversification, and technological dynamism beyond what 
market forces on their own would generate” (p. 99). Empirically it is not hard 
to substantiate this view. Although it is true enough that state intervention 
often fails and makes things much worse instead of better, it is also true that - 
if we focus on the positive cases - the successful development stories would 
not have happened without the states playing a role. However, a major 
theoretical limitation of this body of literature is that it generally takes the 
mutuality and cooperation for granted. If a government cannot satisfactorily 
perform its role or get along well with the private sectors, the benefits argued 
in the literature cannot be realized. To deal with this problem, we need some 
clues on the factors that make a state work better.  
 
2.3 Political Determinants of State Performance 
The key independent variable of this research, state-society synergy, has its 
root in several classical political science literatures that attempt to explain 
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variations in institutional performance across countries. From a statist 
perspective, Skocpol (1985) and her coauthors argue that state capacity comes 
from state autonomy, which is “the ability of states to formulate and pursue 
goals that are not simply reflective of the demands of interests of social groups, 
classes, or society” (p. 9). In other words, state capacity cannot be separated 
from state autonomy. The idea that state capacity is unalienable from state 
autonomy is also evident in Evans’ conceptualization of state-society synergy 
in that a strong state and robust bureaucratic structure are essential to prevent 
the state from succumbing to private interests.  
A limitation of Skocpol’s argument is that it does not specify the type of 
power needed to maintain state autonomy. In this connection, a significant 
contribution of Mann (1997) is the differentiation between two types of state 
power: despotic power and infrastructural power. The former refers to the 
“actions the state elite is empowered to undertake without routine, 
institutionalized negotiation with civil society group” (Mann, 1997, p. 61) 
while the latter is the “capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, 
and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (p. 62). 
State capacity here refers to infrastructural power, which characterizes modern 
states. Unlike despotic power which is exercised by state elite arbitrarily, 
infrastructural power is a highly institutionalized type of power that leads 
people to follow certain rules. Mann’s introduction of despotic and 
infrastructural power contributes to our understanding of the relationship 
between state autonomy and state capacity. Some states, though autonomous, 
are still considered weak because they employ despotic rather than 
infrastructural power to exercise control over a fixed territory. 
15 
 
Migdal’s (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States can be seen as a 
specific approach to Mann’s conception of the relationship between state 
autonomy and capacity. This approach, however, is based on a different model 
of state-society relations. In the introductory chapter, Migdal (1988) presents a 
dual image of the state: “states have become a formidable presence in their 
societies, but many have experienced faltering efforts to get their populations 
to do what state policy makers want them to do” (p. 9). The duality of states – 
their “unmistakable strengths in penetrating societies and their surprising 
weaknesses in effecting goal-orientated social changes” (p. 9) – is the central 
concern of Migdal’s work. 
Unlike Mann who sees states as centralized territories, Migdal’s state-in-
society model depicts society as a mélange of social organizations (Migdal, 
1988, p. 28). This model has two facets: first, “the groups exercising social 
control in a society may be heterogeneous both in their form and in the rules 
they apply”; second, “the distribution of social control in society may be 
among numerous fairly autonomous groups rather than concentrated largely in 
the state” (p. 28). The state’s position in relation to society in this model is that 
the state is just one organization among many. As a result, the state is not 
assumed to dominate society but to compete with other organizations over the 
authority to rule. When societies are strong, states become weak. Many states 
in the Third World are weak precisely because they confront powerful groups 
in society that resist their actions to change the society. 
The main contribution of Migdal is a notion of state capacity that is a 
function of society. Hence, to increase its capacity, a state needs to engage 
society. However, as the state attempts to strengthen its capacity by building 
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links to the society, it often finds its autonomy threatened. Increasingly, the 
survival strategies of the regime and the imperatives of building a strong state 
come into conflict (Migdal 1988). The problem here is that infrastructural 
power (in the form of social engagement) can work in opposite directions. In 
the positive case, the development of infrastructural power gradually replaces 
despotic power and strengthens state capacity as conceived by Mann and 
Migdal. On the other hand, however, the attempt to cultivate infrastructural 
power may sometimes threaten despotic power, resulting in state failure. In 
this case, some states are willing to regain their control through greater 
despotism, leading to state incapacity rather than capacity. An interesting 
question, therefore, is under what circumstances does the positive case occur? 
In other words, what are the necessary conditions or elements that allow weak 
states to develop infrastructural power and state capacity without falling back 
to state failure and despotism? Putnam’s idea of social capital provides us with 
a hint in this direction. 
The central question that Putnam’s (1993) Making Democracy Work 
attempts to answer is: “what are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, 
effective representative institutions?” (p.6). Putnam explains the variation in 
institutional performance across twenty Italian provinces using the concept of 
social capital, which refers to “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions” (p.167). The standard of governance, according to 
Putnam, depends on the level of social capital, which allows society to 
overcome the dilemmas of collective action such as the tragedy of the 
commons and the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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The most obvious contrast between Putnam and Migdal is that for 
Putnam, strong society creates a strong state while for Migdal, it is associated 
with a weak state. Migdal’s conclusion is derived from a more statist view of 
the state and its relation with society. Putnam, on the other hand, adopts a 
society-centered perspective as he sees society as an important source of state 
capacity. He argues that the success of democracy rests upon norms of 
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement across the public-private divide 
(Putnam, 1993). In their works, Putnam and a few other authors provide us 
with a relatively new perspective of state-society relations known as state-
society synergy. Unlike the statist approach which views state and society as 
conflicting forces, this new perspective emphasizes the mutuality between 
society and society. An advantage of the state-society synergy perspective is 
that it does not unilaterally focus on state power and avoid the tension between 
infrastructural and despotic power discussed earlier. States no longer have to 
face the dilemma if state capacity is based on the mutuality between state and 
society rather than the state alone. 
Many scholars have attempted to link social capital to economic 
development. Researches along this line, according to Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000), can be categorized into four distinct perspectives: the communitarian 
view, the networks view, the institutional view and the synergy view. Out of 
the four, the synergy view, “with its emphasis on incorporating different levels 
and dimensions of social capital and its recognition of the positive and 
negative outcomes that social capital can generate, has the greatest empirical 
support and lends itself best to comprehensive and coherent policy 
prescriptions (p. 225). Peter Evans, in particular, has capitalized on the 
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concept of state-society synergy. The most influential body of research 
contributing to the synergy view was published in a special section of the June 
1996 issue of World Development 24(6). Evans and other contributors 
“examined cases from Brazil, India, Mexico, South Korea and Russia in 
search of the conditions that foster developmental synergies” (Woolcock and 






Chapter 3 Argument and Hypothesis 
 
I answer three questions in this section. First, what is state-society synergy and 
what are the underlying factors contributing to the synergy? Second, why is 
cooperation between state and businesses desirable for boasting productivity 
of exporting firms? Third, under what conditions does state-business 
cooperation occur?  
In a nutshell, my answers to the above questions are as follows. State-
society synergy refers to “the potential that communities and formal 
bureaucratic organizations of the state can work together to achieve 
developmental goals” (Evans, 1998, p. 274). Such a potential is conditioned 
by four factors: social capital, state strength (robust bureaucratic structure), 
political competition and equality. Free market is not the optimal strategy to 
improve firms’ productivity because it generates too few investments (in new 
technologies and etc.) compared with the socially optimal level and 
encourages conservative behaviors in the face of risk. State intervention may 
be necessary to restore the socially optimal equilibrium by reducing the level 
of risk faced by firms and coordinating business activities. The cooperation 
between state and businesses is desirable in that connection, but it can only 
occur when the level of state-society synergy exceeds some threshold.  
 
3.1 State-society Synergy 
The idea of state-society synergy is simple. To quote Evans (1998), 
“communities and state agencies need each other. Having strong, sophisticated 
government bureaucracies is an advantage from the point of view of 
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communities, while having organized communities with high levels of social 
capital is an advantage for government bureaucracies” (p. 274).  
Two theoretical perspectives have emerged in the study of state-society 
relations, the state-centered perspective and the society-centered perspective. 
When it comes to economic policy making and implementation, from the 
state-centered perspective, state strength has been regarded as the most 
important political foundation of industrial policy because it allows 
policymakers to independently and coherently formulate and implement 
industrial policies.  
Notwithstanding the importance of state strength, a unilateral focus on 
the state is somewhat misleading. It is not plausible to assume that the state 
has better knowledge about the economy than the society. Uninformed and 
arbitrary state action is dangerous as it can produce disastrous economic 
outcomes. In order to take advantage of state strength, the state needs 
information input from the society. In other words, we are looking for a kind 
of state-society relationship in which the state receives feedback from and 
responds to demands from the society and in the meantime, is strong enough 
to maintain its autonomy. Peter Evans’ notion of “embedded autonomy” is a 
good starting point to move in that direction.  
In his famous book Embedded Autonomy, Evans (1995) makes it clear 
that the debate is not about how much states should intervene. Taking state 
involvement as given, he argues that the “appropriate question is not ‘how 
much’ but ‘what kind’” (p. 10). According to Evans (1995), “embedded 
autonomy”, which refers to the “apparently contradictory combination of 
corporate coherence and connectedness”, provides the underlying structural 
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basis for successful state involvement in industrial transformation (p. 12). Put 
differently, it is the presence of both autonomy and embeddedness that 
constitutes a necessary condition for successful state intervention. As Evans 
comments: 
 “A state that was only autonomous would lack both sources of 
intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralized private 
implementation. Dense connecting networks without a robust 
internal structure would leave the state incapable of resolving 
‘collective action’ problems, of transcending the individual 
interests of its private counterparts” (p. 12).  
 
The idea of “embeddedness” is essential to our understanding of state-
society synergy. It suggests that this synergy “should have a social foundation 
and depends on day-to-day public private interactions and the norms and 
loyalties that build up around them” (Evans, 1996, p. 1121). State-society 
synergy, in a nutshell, consists of a combination of complementarity and 
embedddness. Complementarity, or the division of labor based on the 
contrasting properties of public and private institutions, “creates the potential 
(for synergy) but does not provide an institutional basis for realizing it” (p. 
1130). At the end of the day, it is the “concrete ties connecting state and 
society which make it possible to exploit complementarities” (p. 1130). It is 
obvious that complementarity and embeddedness are complementary rather 
than competing conceptions of state-society synergy.  
Going hand in hand with embeddedness is state strength, or the degree to 
which policy makers and bureaucrats are insulated from interest group 
pressures and their ability to make autonomous decisions. According to Weiss 
and Hobson (1995), such an arrangement is of fundamental importance 
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because it “both insulates the bureaucracy from growth-compromising 
pressures and generally enhances the autonomy necessary for long-run 
decision making” (p. 162). It is important to note that the collaborative 
linkages between the state and the private sectors should not compromise state 
strength. Rather, they constitute a “major, transformative ingredient of that 
strength” (p. 162). Otherwise, it is highly likely for public interests to 
degenerate into private interests, turning embededness into clientelism.  
Political competition as a component of state-society synergy has 
received insufficient attention in existing literatures. It is important that we do 
not take “state-society synergy” to mean “state-society harmony”. Although 
policymakers may share some common interests with their constituencies, “the 
degree to which interests are shared across the public-private divide varies 
substantially from case to case and plays a central role in determining the 
potential for synergy” (Evans, 1996, p. 1127). At the end of day, politics and 
interests are something political scientists cannot run away from. As long as 
interests are heterogeneous, conflicts will naturally arise. An important 
question here is whether these conflicts “are fought over in open political 
competition or contained by repression” (p. 1127). Relating this back to the 
notion of state strength, the argument here is that state power and strength 
need to be based on what Michael Mann calls infrastructural power rather than 
despotic power. Some scholars attribute East Asian state capacity to 
authoritarianism. But as Weiss and Hobson (1995) argue, the peculiar strength 
and capacity of such states resides less in their authoritarian use of power than 
in their unusual combination of bureaucratic autonomy and collaborative 
linkages with the economic sector (p. 162). In short, political regimes are as 
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important as state strength and embeddedness in condition the possibility of 
synergy.  
Last but not least, the societal foundation of creating synergy needs to be 
emphasized. In order to create a synergetic form of state-society relationship, a 
robust state structure has to be complemented by an egalitarian social structure. 
It is more difficult to construct such kind of state-society relationship in highly 
unequal societies because inequality impedes the formation of collaborative 
ties with marginalized and subordinate groups. In a recent paper, Cardenas and 
Tuzemen (2011) empirically show that political and economic inequality is 
negatively associated with state capacity.  
In summary, state-society synergy is an underlying potential that is 
conditioned by embeddedness, state strength, political competition and degree 
of egalitarianism and once activated, enables genuine state-society cooperation. 
Identifying the factors contributing to a synergetic state-society relationship 
provides us with a basis to operationalize and measure state-society synergy. 
This, however, remains the task of the empirical chapter. What I have done in 
the previous paragraphs is to explicate the attributes of state-society synergy 
and show that these four seemingly unrelated concepts can be united under a 
common theme and are mutually supportive of each other. Having understood 
the central concept of the causal argument, the next step is to spell out the 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable and 




3.2 The Argument: Why Does Cooperation Improve Productivity? 
I argue that state-society synergy positively contributes to export 
sophistication of a country through the state-business cooperation it generates. 
The mechanism that underlies this argument is a process of self-discovery 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). It is well known that patterns of international 
trade are greatly shaped by the comparative advantages of different trading 
partners. In standard trade models, comparative advantages are assumed to be 
known. However, this is not always the case in reality, especially in 
developing countries. More often than not, governments and entrepreneurs in a 
developing country must learn what the country is good at producing before 
investment is made to develop a new modern industry. As Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003) point out, “learning what one is good at producing is an 
important determinant of structural change, but it is also one that is unlikely to 
be adequately provided under laissez-faire” (p.628). Because the social return 
to such learning is much larger than private return, “laissez-faire leads to 
underprovision of innovation and governments need to play a dual role in 
fostering industrial growth and transformation” (p. 629). However, 
government interventions are highly likely to fail if the underlying political 
economic arrangement cannot provide the state with the right information 
about the economy or the state is incapable of exercising leadership over the 
private sectors. Thus, a synergetic form of state-society relationship facilitates 
government intervention and accelerates product innovation and industrial 
transformation because 1) the information input from the society helps the 
state discover what the economy is good at producing; and 2) the state has the 
autonomy and capacity needed to conduct industrial policy.  
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Having understood the necessity of state-business cooperation, the next 
question is in what way such cooperation improves the general productivity of 
firms in a country. As explained earlier, the key problem with free market is 
the negligence of externality that implies higher social return than private 
return. Hence, if there is a role for the state to play, it is to restore the socially 
optimal equilibrium through coordination of business activities and industrial 
policies. The body of literature adopting this approach in general belongs to 
the family of ‘threshold externality’ models (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). 
Though these models assume different sources of externality, they are 
comparable in one important aspect: Models in this class indicate that social 
return to investment is higher than private return and the results are 
characterized by the “existence of both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ equilibriums” (Ferris 
and Gawande, 2003, p.86). When multiple equilibriums exist, the role of 
government policy is to “move the economy out of the bad equilibrium into 
the good one” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 2).  
Despite the similarities shared by the “threshold externality” models, I 
use Rodrik’s (1996) model of increasing returns to scale in intermediate goods 
as part of the causal mechanism for one simple reason. The ‘externality 
threshold’ models undoubtedly carry rich hypotheses and profound policy 
implications. However, with the exception of Azariadis and Drazen’s (1990) 
model, “such models have not been subject to formal empirical scrutiny and, 
without an empirical basis, the usefulness of their policy conclusions remains 
problematic” (Ferris and Gawande, 2003, p.86). Ferris and Gawande (2003) 
fill this gap by evaluating the validity of Rodrik’s (1996) model using two 
different sets of cross-country data. The authors conclude that “the empirical 
26 
 
results provide strong affirmation of Rodrik’s hypothesis that a coordination 
failure in intermediate goods can cause underdevelopment traps and that 
government policy can overcome the source of the failure” (Ferris and 
Gawande, 2003, p.107). Given this result, I am more confident of the 
empirical consistency and external validity of the Rodrik model. I will next 
provide a summary of Rodrik’s model and relate it to the current research. 
Interested readers may refer to Rodrik (1996) for more technical details.  
 
3.2.1 The Rodrik Model 
The Rodrik model is a two-sector two-equilibrium model with constant 
return to scale (CRS) in the final goods and increasing return to scale (IRS) in 
intermediate goods. The two final-goods sectors are referred to as ‘low-tech’ 
and ‘high-tech’ sector respectively. In the context of this research, it is the 
development of the high-tech sector that is responsible for rising export 
sophistication of a country. Unlike the low-tech sector which requires just 
capital and labor for production, the high-tech sector requires capital and a 
range of intermediate inputs that are non-tradable and are imperfect substitutes 
for each other.4 Though both sectors use capital as a factor of production, the 
high-tech sector is assumed to be more capital intensive than the low-tech 
sector.  
Leaving the assumptions aside, two special features of the Rodrik model 
are key to the explanatory framework of the current research. First, “the 
productivity of the high-tech sector is linked to the number of input varieties 
                                                            
4 Intermediate goods include but are not limited to producer services, workers with different 
qualifications and specialized inputs (Rodrik, 1996). The assumptions of non-tradability and 
imperfect substitution of intermediate goods imply that a variety of such goods must be 
produced domestically to sustain the ‘high-tech’ sector. 
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available: as the number of intermediate inputs (denote by n) increases, unit 
costs in the high-tech sector decline” (Rodrik, 1996, p.5). 5  Therefore, a 
“threshold number of intermediates must be available before the cost of the 
final good in the high-tech sector falls sufficiently for production to be feasible” 
(Ferris and Gawande, 2003, p. 87). The implication is that government needs 
to act as a coordinator of private firms in order to ensure the supply of 
sufficient intermediate varieties to sustain the high-tech sector in an active 
equilibrium.  
Second, the Rodrik model assumes that production of intermediate goods 
is skill-intensive. It is constructed in such a way that “the competitiveness of 
the high-tech sector depends on both the skill level of the workforce and on 
the range of domestically produced intermediate varieties” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 
7). As a result, this model suggests an interactive relationship between human 
capital and the number of intermediate goods. In particular, the effect of 
intermediate goods on the productivity of high-tech sectors is contingent on 
the level of education of the workforce. In developed countries with well-
educated labor force, the number of intermediate goods produced does not 
matter a lot and the high-tech sectors would still be highly productive even 
with a small number of intermediate goods. Similarly, in poor countries with a 
low stock of human capital, the high-tech sector would remain unproductive 
even with the maximum number of intermediate goods possibly supplied by 
the economy. It is, however, imperative for countries with intermediate levels 
of human capital stock to get the ‘right’ number of intermediate goods. Thus, 
                                                            
5 Formally this is written as ∅ ቀݎ, ݌݊ି భഀషభቁ ൌ ߨ, where r is the rental rate for capital, p is the 
price of the representative intermediate input and π is the world price of the high-tech sector, 
assuming  > 1.  
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government coordination and industrial policy play an important role in these 
countries in making sure that sufficient number of intermediate goods are 
supplied and move the economy from the unproductive equilibrium to the 
productive one.  
The existence of two (stable) equilibriums is illustrated in Figure 1, 
which is taken from Rodrik (1996). The curves in this figure are called iso-
cost curves, which are the loci of wage (w) and rental (r) combinations that 
satisfy the unit-cost conditions for each of the two sectors. The slope of the 
iso-cost curves at any wage and rental combination gives the relative factor 
demand (capital labor ratio) of the sector at that specific factor price 
combination. Given the assumption that the high-tech sector is more capital 
intensive than the low-tech sector, the iso-cost curve of the high-tech sector is 
steeper than that of the low-tech sector because at any given factor prices, the 
high-sector always has a higher capital labor ratio. The straight lines (hereafter 
referred to as price lines) indicate the economy’s capital-labor endowment.6 
Under profit maximization (equivalent to cost minimization), the factor prices 
will adjust to equalize each sector’s relative factor demand with the 
economy’s relative factor endowment. Hence, the economy operates at the 
point where the iso-cost curves are tangent to the price lines. The economy is 
said to be in equilibrium when it is operating at such a point.  
                                                            
6 It can be shown mathematically that the slope of the price line equals to the negative of the 








In the Rodrik model, the position of the high-tech iso-cost curve is 
determined by the number of intermediate varieties n and the stock of human 
capital, h. An increase in n or h is represented by an outward shift of the high-
tech iso-cost curve. For the sake of simplicity, imagine a middle-income 
country with an intermediate level of human capital stock. Then the position 
of the iso-cost curve for the high-tech sector depends on whether the 
government could coordinate the producers of intermediate inputs to supply 
the sufficient number of intermediate varieties. In case of coordination failure, 
the (few) number of intermediate inputs supplied makes the high-tech sector 
unprofitable. In such a situation, the iso-cost curve for the high-tech sector lies 
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equilibrium because it does not satisfy the profit-maximization condition. As a 
result, the factor prices will adjust to (w0, r0), making point D the stable 
equilibrium. In this case, the economy is stuck at the low-tech equilibrium. 
However, if the government could coordinate the producers to supply at least 
n* number of intermediate varieties, the high-tech iso-cost curve is shifted 
outward and the economy can settle at a new equilibrium (point E), where the 
high-tech sector can be sustained. From a welfare perspective, point E is 
obviously a better equilibrium than point D because it allows for higher 
payments to factors of production. In other words, when the high-tech sector is 
actively in equilibrium, workers receive higher wages and capital owners 
receive higher rents vis-à-vis the low-tech equilibrium.  
The Rodrik model can be readily applied to explain the development of a 
country’s export sector. Export sectors in most middle income countries are 
characterized by the existence of two equilibriums. These countries can easily 
get stuck at the low-tech equilibrium by exporting only agricultural or low 
value-added manufactured products. These products can be profitable (to the 
business owners), but do not contribute to the country’s export sophistication 
or improve the general well-being of the population. The Rodrik model 
suggests that to raise the sophistication a country’s exports, the government 
must be able to coordinate the supply of a threshold number of intermediate 
inputs so that the unit cost of the high-tech sector falls sufficiently to make 
production viable. Cost of production is important to a firm’s decision to enter 
the international market because even an established business usually needs to 
make an additional investment in order to export its products to other countries. 
For example, the firm may need to improve the quality of its products to meet 
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certain international standards. It may also find it necessary to promote its 
products to foreign consumers through marketing campaigns. As modeled by 
Melitz (2003), firms deciding to enter the international market face market 
entry costs in addition to per-unit trade costs. Citing several related empirical 
works, the author argues that “the magnitude of such export market entry costs 
is important enough to generate very large hysteresis effects associated with a 
plant’s export market participation” (Melitz, 2003, p. 1698).  
Similar to the risk an entrepreneur faces when setting up a business, 
there is a certain degree of risk associated with entering the international 
market too. On the one hand, exporting firms faces various forms of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers imposed on its products. On the other hand, international 
trade itself has selection effect in a sense that only the most productive firms 
can survive and thrive. Melitz (2003) shows that “exposure to trade generates 
a type of Darwinian evolution within an industry in such a way that the most 
efficient firms thrive and grow, some others may still export but incur losses 
and the least efficient ones are driven out of the industry” (p. 1714).   
Facing high market entry costs and the risk of incurring losses or even 
being driven out of the market, firms, if left on their own, would adopt a very 
conservative attitude towards investing in more sophisticated products and 
entering the export market. Free market, as argued previously, generates too 
few investments and results in slower growth in the overall productivity of the 
economy. Support from the state may reduce the unit cost of production and 
the risk of exposure to international trade, encouraging firms to make more 
investments and improve their productivity.  
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To summarize, the Rodrik model predicts a positive relationship between 
state-business cooperation and export sophistication. Government 
coordination of supply of intermediate goods reduces the unit cost of 
production of ‘sophisticated’ export sectors which use these intermediates in 
their production. Lower cost of production also lowers the risk of entering the 
international market, encouraging firms to invest in products and activities that 
improve the productivity of the industry. To complete the argument and 
establish causality between synergy and productivity of exporting firms, we 
need to answer one more question: If state-business cooperation is good for 
raising productivity, why does such cooperation occur in some countries and 
not in others? In the next few pages, I will attempt to answer this question by 
modeling the strategic interaction between state and firms on the ground of 
rationality and profit maximization.  
 
3.3 The Model: Synergy Threshold for Cooperation 
I present in this section a game-theoretic model to illustrate how state-society 
synergy produces cooperation between state and businesses under a specific 
set of cost-benefit structure. The model also provides a micro-foundation to 
Evans’ macro-theory of synergy and cooperation. Most importantly, this 
model suggests the existence of a synergy threshold. In other words, the 
cooperation between state and businesses can only take place when the level 
of synergy is above a certain point. Therefore, export sophistication rises with 
state-society synergy only after synergy reaches the threshold.  
The set-up of the model is one of a two-player simultaneous game with 
incomplete information. The two players in this game are Firm and State 
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making decisions simultaneously. Firm decides between to invest and not to 
invest and State decides between to support and to do nothing. Incomplete 
information is a feature used to model the factor of risk.  Since neither State 
nor Firm is certain about the success of an investment, the Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium of the game consists of a set of strategies where each player 
maximizes its expected payoff. A successful investment can be conceived in 
this context as a situation in which a firm’s products successfully enter the 
international market and become a source of revenue for the firm. In this 
model, p denotes the probability of a successful investment under free-market 
condition (no state intervention), where 0 < p <1. The magnitude of p is fully 
determined by market conditions and is exogenous to the level of state-society 
synergy. The perceived change in the probability of a successful investment 
due to state-business cooperation is denoted by s. Since the setup of the game 
puts Firm and State in the same information set, the players share a common 
perception about s. We can see that when State and Firm cooperate with one 
another, namely when Firm decides to invest and State decides to support, the 
probability of the investment being successful is p+s. Theoretically s can be 
both positive and negative since state intervention can be perceived sometimes 
as detrimental rather than beneficial, making things worse instead of better.  
Unlike p which is independent of state-society synergy, the value of s is 
conditioned by the level of synergy. The reason for this is simple. If a country 
is well endowed with social capital, governed by a democratic regime and has 
a strong state, both the state and the firms tend to be more optimistic about the 
prospect of their cooperation because of mutual trust, greater transparency, 
better institutional environment and less corruption. On the contrary, absence 
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of these elements fosters mutual suspicion between state and firms, leading to 
a shared pessimism about the prospect of cooperation. To capture this 
relationship between synergy and perceived value of s, this model assumes 
that s increases monotonically with synergy. That is to say, higher state-
society synergy facilitates cooperation between state and firms and leads to 
higher perceived probability of successful investment vis-à-vis free market. As 
mentioned earlier, we have no reason to rule out negative values of s and I 
assume s to be negative at extremely low values of synergy. Formally I write s 
as a function of synergy:  
ݏ ∈ ݂ሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕሻ, 
where f is well-behaving (continuous and homothetic) and satisfies the 
following conditions: 
݂ᇱ ൐ 0	; ݂ᇱᇱ ൏ 0 , and 
lim௫→଴ ݂ᇱሺݔሻ ൌ ∞; lim௫→ஶ ݂ᇱሺݔሻ ൌ 0 
The first set of conditions simply says that s increases with synergy but at a 
decreasing rate. The second set (also known as Inada conditions) states that s 
increases rapidly at low levels of synergy and eventually levels off at high 
levels of synergy. These conditions together ensure that there is a one-to-one 
relationship between values of s and levels of synergy.  
This model further assumes that if an investment is successful, Firm 
earns revenue equal to 1. However, to make the investment, Firm has to pay a 
sunk start-up cost c, which can be interpreted as the export market entry cost 
mentioned earlier. A successful investment by Firm also benefits State 
because the state earns more foreign reserves if its firms sell their products to 
other countries. In addition, a thriving export sector may be a sign of 
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economic prosperity and therefore, boost the national image of a country. This 
benefit of a successful investment to State is denoted by b. However, if State 
decides to support Firm in its investment, it has to put in an effort e in 
formulating and implementing certain industrial policies. If an investment fails, 
State loses the effort e and Firm loses its start-up cost c. In fact, -c is a rather 
conservative estimate of a firm’s loss in case of unsuccessful entry to the 
export market because the selection effect of international trade  may drive 
inefficient firms out of the industry.  
 
Figure 2: Extensive Form for the Firm-State Game 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the extensive form of the game with each player’s 
expected pay-offs and the corresponding outcomes. To solve for the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of the game, we solve for each player’s best responses to the 
other’s player’s strategy. If States supports, Firm will choose to invest if  
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(p+s)(1-c) + (1-p-s)(-c),  
(p+s)(b-e) + (1-p-s)(-e) 









ሺ݌ ൅ ݏሻሺ1 െ ܿሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ െ ݏሻሺെܿሻ ൐ 0, which implies 
ݏ ൐ ܿ െ ݌       (1) 
Rewriting inequality (1) as ሺݏ ൅ ݌ሻ ൈ 1 ൐ ܿ , we can see that with 
support of the state, the firm will only make the investment if its expected 
revenue exceeds the cost. Similarly, if Firm invests, State will choose to 
support if 
ሺ݌ ൅ ݏሻሺܾ െ ݁ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ െ ݏሻሺെ݁ሻ ൐ ܾ݌, which implies 
ݏ ൐ ݁ ܾ⁄       (2) 
Inequality (2) implies ݏܾ ൐ ݁ , which states that the state will only 
support a firm’s investment if the additional expected benefit to the state 
exceeds its effort in supporting the firm. For the strategy [invest, support] to 
be the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, condition (1) and (2) must be satisfied 
simultaneously. In other words, the cooperation between State and Firm can 
only happen if s is above some positive number (note that e/b > 0).  
Figure 3 illustrates the synergy threshold graphically. The upper panel 
plots the perceived change in probability of successful investment s against 
state-society synergy. Function f satisfies the conditions mentioned earlier and 
maps s one to one onto synergy. Let s* denote the minimum value of s that 
satisfies condition (1) and (2), then s* corresponds to some level of synergy γ, 
which is the minimum level of synergy that enables state-society cooperation, 
namely the synergy threshold. This model does not make any assumptions 
regarding the specific values of c-p and e/b. Their magnitudes are exogenous 
to this model and in general vary from one country to another, but which one 
is larger does not change the argument qualitatively. The lower panel plots 
cooperation against synergy. We can see that cooperation remains nonexistent 
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until synergy reaches its threshold value γ. For levels of synergy above γ, 
greater synergy induces more cooperation between state and businesses and 
this will have a positive effect on the productivity of exporting firms. For 
simplicity, a linear relationship is assumed between synergy and cooperation 
for all levels of synergy above the threshold.  
 















It is tempting to ask what happens when the level of synergy falls below 
the threshold and therefore, fails to generate cooperation between state and 
businesses. Theoretically there are three possible scenarios under such a 
circumstance: firms are willing to invest but state does nothing to support the 
investments (݁ ܾ⁄ ൐ ݏ ൐ ܿ െ ݌); state is ready to support new investments but 
firms do not want to invest (ܿ െ ݌ ൐ ݏ ൐ ݁ ܾ⁄ ); firms do not want to invest 
and state does nothing (ݏ ൏ ܿ െ ݌ and ݏ ൏ ݁ ܾ⁄ ).  
The first scenario corresponds to the free market condition with minimal 
state intervention. While this outcome is the most preferred from a 
neoclassical perspective, it generates less than the socially optimal amount of 
investment in the high-tech sector, according to the Rodrik model. In 
developed economies, state intervention may not be necessary because their 
high-quality labor force guarantees the economy to settle at the high-tech 
equilibrium. In middle-income countries, however, the economy may get stuck 
at the low-tech equilibrium due to lack of government intervention. Gain in 
productivity in this case is therefore limited, if at all. In light of the strategic 
interaction represented by the game-theoretic model, this outcome can also be 
interpreted as opportunism on the part of the state.  The state in this regard 
bets that the firms will successfully enter the international market without its 
support so that it will earn its expected pay-off bp without putting in effort e. 
Again, state opportunism may not be harmful in developed economies because 
the firms are competitive enough internationally. It is, however, undesirable 
for governments of middle-income countries to gamble in this way because 




The second scenario is what I refer to as coordination failure, where the 
government is willing but fails to act as a coordinator as state effort is 
unsuccessful in getting firms to invest. This outcome is usually associated with 
either a weak state or a weak private sector. It comes as a result of either the 
state being incapable of coordinating business activities or the private sector 
being too weak to carry out the investment even with state support. Gain in 
productivity in this case is possible but goes beyond the explanatory scope of 
the current framework. The set-up of the game-theoretic model assumes that 
the state may act as a coordinator but not an investor like a private firm. 
However, the role played by a strong state can in fact go far beyond that of an 
active coordinator of private firms. As Rodrik (1996) comments, when all else 
have failed, the state can resort to public enterprises provided that it is able to 
do so. Singapore is an interesting example to illustrate this point. Unlike other 
newly industrialized economies in East Asia such as Hong Kong and South 
Korea, Singapore is plagued with the historical weakness of its indigenous 
private sector. The Singaporean state has been acting as an entrepreneur by 
setting up government-linked companies (GLCs) through Temasek Holdings, 
the public holding company fully owned by the Ministry of Finance.7 This 
strategy turned out to be a great success in promoting productivity and 
Singapore ranks the second in Asia in terms of the sophistication level of its 
exports.  
In the third scenario, there is simply no gain in productivity because the 
status quo is maintained. If the economy is operating at the low-tech 
                                                            
7 Chen and Li (2011) provide a detailed discussion on the role of the Singaporean government 
as an entrepreneur. This paper was presented at the Inaugural International Workshop for 




equilibrium, it gets stuck there. Due to the commonly perceived low value of s, 
neither the state nor the private sector has any incentive to change the status 
quo. Hence, this situation corresponds to extremely low levels of synergy, an 
underdevelopment trap that afflicts many poor countries.  
This completes the analysis of the game-theoretic model. It is important 
to point out that the focus of this paper is the effect of state-business 
cooperation derived from higher than γ levels of synergy. For the sake of 
completeness, I have briefly discussed the three alternative scenarios where 
cooperation fails to take place. Besides the third scenario, absence of 
cooperation does not necessarily mean low productivity of exporting firms. 
However, the causal story of sophisticated export products in these cases, if 
any, may be very different from the one I am telling here. Singapore, for 
example, is a sophisticated exporter as a result of very different political-
economic dynamics, as I would argue. The alternative sources of export 
sophistication no doubt deserve further study, but they are beyond the scope of 
this research. The empirical implication is that variations in export 
sophistication beyond the explanation of state-society synergy and several 
other control variables are treated as stochastic processes in econometric 
specification.  
The game theoretic model constructed here is not simply a repetition of 
Evans’ theory that higher synergy is good for cooperation. Instead, it brings 
that general theory to a particular context under a specific cost-benefit 
structure. In addition, it is articulated in this model that the mechanism by 
which synergy generates cooperation stands on the ground of rational strategic 
interaction between state and societal players. Thus, this model provides a 
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micro-foundation to Evans’ macro-theory and rules out any form of 
cooperation based on irrational elements such as nationalism.  
 
3.4 Putting the Pieces Together 
We are now ready to put the pieces together and complete the causal 
argument. In a nutshell, the causal mechanism can be summarized as follows: 
A high level of synergy (above γ) enables cooperation between state and 
business as it fosters a mutually perceived optimism about the prospect of 
cooperation. Once state and businesses cooperate, the Rodrik model is 
activated. Firms will invest in more productive activities and governments will 
coordinate these activities to ensure the supply of different intermediate inputs. 
This will move the economy to the high-tech equilibrium and exporting firms 
will sell more sophisticated products to international consumers. This 
mechanism is illustrated in Figure 4.  
With the above argument, I put forward the main hypothesis as follows: 
Holding economic fundamentals constant, countries with higher 
state-society synergy tend to export more sophisticated products 
and this relationship only holds when state-society synergy exceeds 
a certain threshold.  
I do not perceive a dangerous threat of reverse causation in this case 
because as far as I know, there has been no plausible argument suggesting 
what a country exports could affect the form of relationship the state has with 
the society. Export of certain products may have some distributional effect, 
making some groups better off than others and raising the overall level of 
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inequality within a society. But other than that, it is hard to think of the other 
three components of state-society synergy (embeddedness, state strength and 
political competition) having to do with what a country sells to the rest of the 
world.  
 





value of s 
Cooperation between state 
and businesses 
If s > s* Otherwise 
Rodrik model activated 
Higher productivity and export 
sophistication 
Stock of human capital 





No cooperation between 
state and businesses 
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This analysis needs to control for several variables that have been 
identified as powerful predictors of export sophistication in previous works. 
Given that export sophistication is a relatively new concept, its determinants 
have not been widely studied. For the current research, I will control for the 
economic fundamentals which were found to be significant in Hausmann, 
Hwang and Rodrik’s (2007) article, namely GDP per capita, human capital, 
and country size measured by population. In addition to that, I also control for 
FDI inflow because it is a common belief that FDI brings in advanced 
technologies and improve productivity of the host country.  
 
3.5 Evaluation 
I conclude this chapter with an evaluation of my argument and a critical 
assessment of the Rodrik Model. Readers may feel that the argument is too 
pessimistic about the prospect of free market. I believe that represents a 
misunderstanding of my argument and the Rodrik model. It is true that the 
game-theoretic model rests on the assumption that higher state-society synergy 
leads to higher perceived changes in the probability of a successful investment. 
However, this does not mean that market must fail and lead to inferior 
outcomes. What I am considering here and what the Rodrik model studies is a 
very special type of investment, investment in more sophisticated products 
that have never been produced domestically. Simply put, it is investment in 
innovation. In such circumstances, free market is more likely to lead to 
inferior outcomes as it cannot generate sufficient innovation to make the 
economy a more sophisticated exporter. When this happens, state-society 
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synergy plays a role in facilitating state-business cooperation, which helps the 
economy climb the sophistication ladder.  
Empirically, state-society synergy matters the most in upper-middle 
income countries, as the next chapter shows. However, the argument does not 
only apply to middle-income countries. Entrepreneurs in high-income 
countries face exactly the same problem when investing in new products. It is 
also true that there are significant variations in export sophistication and 
political environment among high income countries. What we should note, 
however, is that the argument may not hold in low-income countries where 





Chapter 4 Empirical Analysis 
 
This chapter operationalizes and measures the dependent, independent and 
control variables and carries out the empirical analysis to test the main 
hypothesis as well as two additional hypotheses derived from the Rodrik 
Model. For the purpose of this research, I use Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik’s 
(2007) measure of export sophistication (EXPY) as the dependent variable. As 
explained earlier, the key explanatory variable (state-society synergy) has four 
different dimensions. Thus, I use one indicator for each dimension and 
construct a “synergy index”. Since data are available for 12 years from 1992 to 
2003, the dataset has a time-series cross sectional structure. For the benchmark 
specification, the data follows a standard two-way fixed-effect model. The 
same model is then estimated for different subsamples according to the level 
of per-capita income. I will also explore the interaction between the synergy 
index and human capital and FDI respectively. Overall, the threshold effect of 
synergy is well reflected in the evidence and synergy has a stronger effect on 
export sophistication in countries that have better educated labor force and 
receive more investment from abroad.  
 
4.1 Data and Measurement: The Dependent Variable  
Since the dependent variable is identical to the index of export sophistication 
put forward by Hausmann et.al. (2007), I only provide a brief summary on the 
construction of EXPY. Readers may refer to Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 
(2007) for more details.  
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The first step in the construction of EXPY is to calculate the 









In the above equation, Xj is the total exports of country j and Yj is the 
per-capita GDP of country j. The numerator of the weight, xjk/Xj, is the value 
share of commodity k in country j’s overall export basket. The denominator of 
the weight is then the aggregate of the value shares across all countries 
exporting commodity k. The overall index PRODYk therefore is a weighted 
average of per-capita GDPs of all countries exporting good k, where the 
weights correspond to the revealed comparative advantage of each country in 
producing the good.  
Finally, the productivity (sophistication) level associated with country 
j’s overall export basket, EXPYj is: 
ܧܺܲ ௝ܻ ൌ෍ݔ௝௞௝ܺ ܴܱܲܦ ௞ܻ௞
 
The EXPY of country j is therefore the weighted average of PRODY 
for that country, where the weights are again the value shares of the products 
in the country’s total exports.  
To better illuminate how export sophistication is measured, I shall now 
illustrate its calculation using a simple hypothetical example. The formal 
construction of the sophistication index mentioned just now follows the same 
idea, but is complicated by the weights (export shares) that reflect comparative 
advantages. To begin with, suppose there are only two countries in the world, 
country A and county B. Country A has a per-capita GDP of $1000 and 
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exports two products, textiles and radios. Country B has a per-capita GDP of 
$3000 and also exports two products, radios and computers. In this set-up, 
since radio is exported by two countries with different per-capita incomes, the 
level of sophistication associated with radio (PRODYradio) is the average of the 
exporters’ per-capita incomes, that is (1000+3000)/2=2000. Since country A is 
the only exporter of textiles, the sophistication level associated with textile is 
simply country A’s per-capita GDP, namely 1000. Similarly, the 
sophistication level of computer (only exported by country B) is 3000, which 
is country B’s per-capita GDP. Now, since country A’s export basket contains 
two products associated with different levels of sophistication, the 
sophistication index of country A’s overall export basket (EXPYA) is the 
average of the two products’ sophistication scores, that is 
(1000+2000)/2=1500. In the same way, country B’s overall export 
sophistication is calculated to be (2000+3000)/2=2500. Hence, we can say that 
country B’s export basket is more sophisticated than that of country A.  
 
4.2 Data and Measurement: The Independent Variable 
The key explanatory variable, state-society synergy, is measured using a 
composite index. The indicators of the various dimensions of this concept 
closely follow Evans’ (1996) conceptualization and are measured as much as 
possible using established measures. Before moving on to the indicator items, 
it is worthwhile to comment briefly on the methodology of index construction. 
The key challenge of measuring synergy is that we are dealing with a latent 
variable that cannot be directly observed. When it comes to measuring an 
unobserved variable, the conventional approach is to look for indicators that 
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are effects of the variable. For example, attacks on foreigners can be used to 
measure the latent variable xenophobia. An alternative measurement approach, 
which is adopted in this paper, is – to use the language of Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer (2001) – the formative approach. 8  Formative indicators are 
observed variables that are theoretically causing rather than being caused by 
the latent variable. Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) provide several 
examples of commonly used composite indices that are constructed from a 
formative perspective, such as Hauser’s (1971) measurement of 
socioeconomic status (SES), Daly and Cobb’s (1989) index of sustainable 
economic welfare, the human development index by UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program, 1990) and Johnston’s (1988) quality of life index.  
Under strict operationalism, “a concept becomes its measure and has no 
meaning beyond that measure… The entire meaning of a theoretical concept is 
assigned to its measurement and any theoretical concept has one and only one 
measure” (Bagozzi, 1982, p. 15, cited in Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 
2001, p. 270). The contemporary view, on the other hand, allows a concept to 
be defined “as a function of its measurements” (Bagozzi and Fornell, 1982, p. 
34, cited in Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001, p. 270), and thus, permits 
multiple measures. According to this view, Evans’ conceptualization of state-
society synergy can be specified as  
Synergy = ߛଵ embeddedness + ߛଶ state strength + 
ߛଷ political competition + ߛସ egalitarianism,  
                                                            
8 I owe a big debt of gratitude to Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001), which provides an 
insightful discussion on index construction with formative indicators. I have followed their 
methodological guidelines closely in constructing and evaluating the synergy index. 
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where γi is the contribution of ith component to synergy. Since we have no 
theoretical basis to assign different weights to different indicators at the 
moment, I adopt the common practice to add up equally weighted items to 
form the composite index, even though the equally weighted linear composite 
for the formative indicators is not fully equal to the latent variable due the 
equation disturbance (Bollen and Lennox, 1991).  
Embeddedness is measured by the endowment of social capital. I use the 
dataset developed by Garcia, Martinez and Fernandez de Guevara 
Radoselovics (2008), which estimates a country’s social capital stock in a 
particular year. The dataset comprises an unbalanced panel of 78 countries for 
the period 1970-2005. Although social scientists have recognized the 
significance of social capital, its measurement has never been easy. Existing 
indicators of social capital generally attempt to quantify the concept either 
“through its antecedents or causes, or through the consequences resulting from 
attitudes of cooperation” (Garcia et.al, 2008, p. 5). On the whole, “their 
theoretical groundings as measures of capital are not solid and they do not 
allow a clear causal relation to be established between the concept and its 
measure” (p. 5). The indicator used here is constructed as a function of a set of 
variables which facilitate a more reliable approach to the empirical estimation 
of social capital than traditional measures do. In this approach, social capital is 
evaluated according to its expected future profitability. The optimal 
investment in social capital by an individual derives from the problem of 
maximizing the future income made by the investor. 
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Tax revenue has been frequently used as an indicator of state strength.9 
While this is certainly not a perfect indicator, it still allows us to distinguish 
states according to their capabilities. Indicators of state strength generally 
suffer from two sorts of problems. First, they “tell more about the general 
assignment of resources than about their actual use” (Migdal, 1988, p. 279). 
Second, they “do not distinguish effectively between social and material 
resources and state abilities to extract or employ those resources” (p. 279). Tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP is a measure that “compares countries on the 
basis of the percentage of GDP in the state sector” (p. 280). This measure 
partially overcomes the second problem, if not the first. Furthermore, Lewis 
(1966) shows that a state needs to spend at least 20% of its GDP to perform its 
duties and remain functional. The baseline is that though a state that collects 
an adequate amount of tax may not be very capable if the money is not used 
properly, a state that fails to do so would surely be a weak one. In this thesis, I 
measure state strength using tax revenue as a percentage of GDP from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
The best proxy for the level of political competition of a country is the 
Polity score in the Polity IV database developed by Jaggers and Gurr (1995). 
The Polity conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines concomitant 
qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, 
rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance (Polity IV 
Project, 2011). This scheme consists of six component measures that record 
key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and 
political competition (Polity IV Project, 2011). The "Polity Score" captures 
                                                            
9 Acemolgu (2005) and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2011) provide some discussions on 
the role of taxes in fostering state capacity. Cardenas and Tuzemen (2011) is an empirical 
example where state capacity is measured using tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.  
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this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Although Munck and 
Verkuilen (2002) point out that the Polity dataset adopts the minimalist 
definition of democracy and omits political participation, all existing indices 
of democracy have limitations in conceptualization. What really makes the 
Polity score stand out from its competitors is the methodology used to 
construct the index. Indeed, Polity IV is a model of clarity. Its coding rules are 
“explicit and provide a fair amount of detail” (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, p. 
19). Furthermore, it is one of the few projects “which uses multiple coders and 
conducts inter-coder reliability test” (p. 20). Overall, the dataset sets a high 
standard in terms of validity, reliability, and replicability. Even though 
participation is allegedly omitted in the index, the focus here is political 
competition, which is measured adequately by the index. Thus, the omission 
has little adverse impact on the validity of the synergy index.   
The degree of egalitarianism is proxied by the net Gini coefficient for 
the total population of a country. I use the data from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database developed by Solt (2009). To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the latest database on world income inequality, which, 
according to the author, “represents a particular choice in the balance between 
comparability and coverage” (p. 240). Gini coefficient is a continuous variable 
ranging from 0 to 100. A lower value of the coefficient indicates a more 
egalitarian social structure. Net Gini differs from gross Gini in that the former 
takes into consideration the effect of government redistribution. In many 
European countries, for example, net Gini is much lower than gross Gini, 
indicating substantial redistribution of income. In the developing world, on the 
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other hand, with uniformly low taxes and lack of effective policies to 
redistribute income, gross and net income inequality are very highly related 
(Solt, 2009). As a result, it can be observed from the dataset that “the 
correlation between gross and net income inequality is considerably lower 
among the advanced countries than among the developing countries”10 (p.239).  
The four indicators are then rescaled, standardized, and combined into a 
single index in such a way that high values indicate high state-society synergy. 
I first rescale each indicator to range from 0 to 25. Gini coefficients are 
multiplied by -1 before rescaling so that for the new measurement, a higher 
value means greater equality. Finally, I add up the four indicators to generate 
the synergy index, which theoretically ranges from 0 to 100. The major 
advantage of this composite index is its comprehensive representation of the 
concept according to the way it has been conceptualized. From a theoretical 
perspective, “omission of indicators carries the risk of changing the construct 
itself” (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001, p. 272) and this is typically so 
with formative indicators as “omitting an indicator is omitting a part of the 
construct” (Bollen and Lennox 1991, p.308).  Content specification is of 
paramount importance in index construction because “an index is more 
abstract and ambiguous than a latent variable measured with reflective 
indicators” (Bagozzi, 1994, p. 333). Under formative measurement, “content 
specification is inextricably linked with indicator specification” 
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001, p. 271), which makes it compulsory 
                                                            
10 The author reports that the correlation between gross and net income inequality is 0.967 
among the developing countries and 0.749 among the advanced industrial countries. 
Differences in gross income inequality explain 93.5% of the variance in net income inequality 
in the developing countries, but in the advanced countries, they explain only 56.1% (Solt, 




for the indicator items used to cover the entire domain of content the index is 
trying to capture. In this regard, we can at least have confidence in the validity 
of the synergy index on the basis of content validity.  A drawback of using the 
index would be that the values are not directly interpretable as a result of 
standardization.  
Other than the issue of content specification and validity, indicator 
exogeneity is a property of formative indicators that sharply distinguish them 
from reflective indicators (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Under 
reflective measurement, indicators are exchangeable and should exhibit a high 
degree of correlation among themselves. However, from a formative 
perspective, the indicators are exogenously determined and therefore, are not 
necessarily inter-correlated. Unlike with reflective indicators, it is not very 
meaningful to report inter-indicator correlations as a check of validity here 
because “there is no reason that a specific pattern of signs or magnitude should 
characterize the correlations among formative indicators” (Bollen, 1984, cited 
in Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001, p. 271). As Nunnally and Bernstein 
(1994) comment, “internal consistency is of minimal importance because two 
variables that might even be negatively related can both serve as meaningful 
indicators of a construct” (p. 489).  
A final issue particular to formative indicators is that of multicollinearity. 
Given that the formative approach to index construction is based on a multiple 
regression, excessive collinearity among indicators thus makes it difficult to 
separate the distinct influence of individual components on the latent variables 
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Bollen and Lennox (1991) suggest 
that if a particular indicator turns out to be almost a perfect linear combination 
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of other indicator(s), it is likely to contain redundant information and may be 
excluded from the index. In this case, multicollinearity among the four 
indicators of synergy does not seem to pose a dangerous threat. I regress the 
final index on the four indicators items in a multiple regression and the mean 
variance inflation factor (VIF) turns out to be 1.21 and the maximum VIF is 
1.33, which is much lower than the rule-of-thumb threshold of 5. 
Multicollinearity is not a cause of concern because even with the indicator 
carrying the largest VIF, the standard error is only 1.15 times as large as it 
would be if that indicator were perfectly uncorrelated with other indicator 
items.  
 
4.3 Data and Measurement: Control Variables 
This analysis needs to control for several variables identified as significant 
predictors of export sophistication in Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik’s (2007) 
work. Among these variables, level of economic development measured by 
GDP per capita carries the most explanatory power. This is not surprising 
given that EXPY is in fact an export similarity index. Exports of rich countries 
by definition rank higher in terms of sophistication. Hence, it is crucial to 
control for the effect of economic development. In this paper, I use the PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators. Country 
size proxied by population is also highly significant, suggesting that other 
things being equal, larger countries tend to export more sophisticated products. 
Though the authors prefer to conceive the relationship between country size 
and export sophistication in causal terms, they did not provide a causal 
explanation of why such a relationship holds. If we take product innovation as 
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an important step towards higher export sophistication, then it is possible to 
argue that a larger population favors invention of new products and hence has 
a positive effect on export sophistication. The idea here is pretty similar to 
Lin’s (1995) model of technological invention. Inventive activity like R & D 
“involves series of trial and error and can therefore be perceived as a random 
process with each trial being a random draw from the invention distribution” 
(Lin, 1995, p. 276). Thus, the probability of successfully inventing a more 
sophisticated product is positively correlated with the number of trials. In 
larger countries with larger workforce, production naturally involves greater 
number of trials, which means higher pace of product innovation. The 
implication is that small countries need to put in a deliberate effort in 
advancing productive technologies, relying less on experience-based 
innovation and more on rigorous scientific research and experimentation. 
Stock of human capital is another variable that influences sophistication 
of exports. In Hausmann, Hwang and Rodirk’s (2007) regression, it is initially 
significant at 5% level, but loses its significance when rule of law and country 
size are included in the regression. This makes it less likely that what a 
country exports is directly determined by the overall educational level of the 
workforce. However, in light of Rodrik’s (1996) model presented earlier, I 
hypothesize that human capital is an important intervening variable that 
conditions the effect of the key independent variable. I will therefore include 
human capital in the regression and proxy it with the percentage of population 
above 15 years of age with completed secondary education in the Barro-Lee 
database. Finally, the amount of foreign direct investment coming into a 
country is measured by net FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP obtained from 
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the World Development Indicators. As with human capital, FDI is less likely 
to have a direct impact on export sophistication because there is no mechanism 
to ensure that FDI would necessarily transfer technologies to host countries 
and improve their productivities. However, FDI may be another intervening 
variable as inflow of foreign capital does change the capital-labor ratio of an 
economy, which according to the Rodrik model, makes the high-tech 
equilibrium more attainable. For this reason, I use net FDI inflow, which is the 
difference between capital flowing into and out of a country instead of stock 
of FDI as with the assumption of labor immobility, the former better reflects 
changes in the capital-labor ratio of the domestic economy.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
EXPY ( Export 
Sophistication) 1285 11135.1 10732.4 4375.2 1996.0 26217.7 
GDP per capita 2112 9721.9 5019.6 11362.8 140.0 67945.3 
Human Capital 1332 11.3 9.9 9.7 0.1 48.2 
Population (millions) 2529 2.77 0.49 11.2 0.0009 129 
Net FDI inflow 2094 5.00 1.83 24.6 -82.9 564.9 
Social Capital 879 5.2 4.27 3.3 0 25 
State Strength 961 8.2 7.88 3.9 0 25 
Institution/Democracy 1856 15.8 18.8 8.4 0 25 
Equality 1572 14.6 15.1 4.9 0 25 
Synergy Index 500 51.2 51.1 10.6 26.2 81.0 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the abovementioned variables. 
Countries with the highest export sophistication include Luxembourg, French 
Polynesia, Switzerland, Ireland, Japan and Germany. As for synergy, Ireland 
appears on the top of the list, followed by Netherland, New Zealand, Denmark, 
Slovenia and Norway. South Korea leads Asian countries in terms of synergy 
and ranks the third in export sophistication, after Japan and Singapore.  
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4.4 The Benchmark Model 
The central question the benchmark model is intended to answer is “to what 
extent and in what way does state-society synergy affect export sophistication?” 
Based on the theoretical framework and the findings of previous work, I 
hypothesize that export sophistication is a function of state-society synergy, 
size of population, stock of human capital, net FDI inflow and GDP per capita 
representing the level of economic development.  Taking the natural-log 
format of some variables, the hypothesized relationship can be written as: 
logሺܧܺܲ ௜ܻ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ݃ሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ௜௧, logሺ݃݀݌݌ܿ௜௧ሻ, 
logሺܱܲ ௜ܲ௧ሻ , ܪݑ݉ܥܽ݌௜௧, ܨܦܫ௜௧ሻ ൅ ௜ܸ ൅ ௧ܷ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                     (3) 
where α is the constant term, EXPY is the Hausmann-Hwang-Rodrik index of 
export sophistication, synergy is the synergy index constructed using the four 
indicators mentioned earlier, gdppc is the per-capita GDP in PPP terms, POP 
is the population,  HumCap is the proxy for human capital and FDI is net FDI 
inflow as a percentage of GDP. The error structure consists of a country fixed 
effect Vi, common shocks to all countries in year t Ut and the 
contemporaneous error term εit. At present, determinants of export 
sophistication have not been systematically studied in the existing literatures. 
Hence, it is essential to include country and year fixed effects to control for 
the effects of unlisted variables across time and space. As mentioned earlier, 
below-threshold levels of state-society synergy does not necessarily mean the 
demise of productivity growth due to the existence of alternative political-
economic dynamics. In this connection, country fixed effect helps to control 
for the effects of idiosyncratic factors that are specific to individual countries 








Figure 5 plots EXPY against synergy index with the best fitted line and 
95% confidence interval calculated from standard deviation. This plot presents 
some informal evidence on the hypothesized relationship between export 
sophistication and state-society synergy as well as the threshold effect of 
synergy. We can see that the fitted line stays flat initially and only begins to 
pick up when the synergy index reaches somewhere between 40 and 45. We 
can also observe from this figure that most countries stay within the 95% 
confidence interval, though there is a small number of outliers in the upward 
direction. Countries with low synergy scores exhibit greater variability in the 
level of export sophistication, confirming the earlier argument that lack of 
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The essence of the model is to establish that synergy affects export 
sophistication and there is a threshold of synergy beyond which a positive and 
robust relationship between the two variables can be observed. To empirically 
model this relationship, I estimate the benchmark model under two different 
specifications. The first strategy specifies a quadratic model by including a 
non-linear term and the second employs the linear spline function. In the 
former case, the function g() in equation (3) is specified as a quadratic 
function of synergy. Specifically, the econometric specification takes the form 
of ߚଵݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ ൅ ߚଶݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕଶ  where 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 and the synergy 
threshold γ is the point െߚଵ/ሺ2ߚଶሻ calculated from the first order condition. 
Though the shape of the fitted line in Figure 5 resembles an exponential 
function rather than a quadratic function, it would nevertheless be 
inappropriate to estimate an exponential model here. The key feature stated in 
the main hypothesis is the existence of a synergy threshold. However, the 
exponential function ݕ ൌ ݁௫does not really contain such a threshold because 
its first order derivative (ௗ௬ௗ௫ ൌ ݁௫) is always positive for all real values of x. 
Though we have no idea on the true form of the population regression function, 
we know that the quadratic model allows for at least one bend in the curve. In 
other words, if a synergy threshold really exists in the data, it would be more 





Table 2: Regression Analysis of the Benchmark Model (Quadratic) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (EXPY) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE FE 
      
Synergy -0.0211** -0.0164*** -0.0102*** -0.00903*** -0.00845** 
 (0.00822) (0.00575) (0.00376) (0.00341) (0.00371) 
Synergy2 0.000352*** 0.000194*** 7.48e-05** 6.52e-05** 6.18e-05* 
 (8.04e-05) (5.59e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.24e-05) (3.49e-05) 
Log (GDP per capita)  0.226*** -0.0272 0.0902** 0.0764** 
  (0.0114) (0.0297) (0.0361) (0.0385) 
Log (Population)  0.0618*** -0.258*** 0.0593 0.0319 
  (0.00570) (0.0726) (0.0956) (0.100) 
Human Capital  0.00346*** 0.00426 0.00243 0.00179 
  (0.000874) (0.00403) (0.00364) (0.00398) 
FDI Inflow  0.00105 -8.27e-05 -0.000540 -0.000163 
  (0.00128) (0.000520) (0.000487) (0.000509) 
Constant 9.578*** 6.564*** 14.32*** 7.943*** 8.518*** 
 (0.205) (0.214) (1.120) (1.730) (1.790) 
      
Time Effect No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 438 419 419 419 419 
R-squared 0.313 0.701 0.107 0.336 0.148 
No. of countries   61 61 61 
 
Model (3) to (5) are estimated using country-fixed effect. 
Year dummies are included in Model (4). 
Model (5) replaces year dummies with a linear time trend.  
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results of the benchmark model. All 
models in the table are estimated using the full sample. Since the synergy 
index can be generated only for countries with data on all four indicators, 438 
observations are retained. Including the control variables further introduces 
missing data, yielding a final sample of 419 observations comprising 61 
countries. Model (1) is the sparse baseline model estimated using pooled OLS 
regression. This model includes only the synergy index and its square term, 
both of which turn out to be statistically significant, indicating a non-linear 
relationship between synergy and export sophistication. The fact that the 
quadratic term is significant at 1% level rejects the null hypothesis that 2 = 0, 
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providing formal evidence to the informal inspection in Figure 5. The signs of 
both coefficients are also consistent with my expectation. A negative 
coefficient for the linear term and a positive coefficient for the square term 
together mean that EXPY does not vary or decreases at low levels of synergy 
and rises as synergy gets higher. Overall, this piece of evidence is supportive 
of the threshold effect of synergy mentioned earlier.  
Unlike the case of linear models, the magnitudes of coefficients in 
quadratic models are not so straightforward to interpret. The coefficients of 
linear models have the natural interpretation of expected partial effect of a 
regressor. That is, the coefficient indicates the expected change in Y 
associated with a unit change in X, holding other regressors constant. 
However, with the exception of very special circumstances, this is not usually 
the case with quadratic models. In this case, for example, it would be very 
misleading to interpret the (negative) coefficient of synergy as the partial 
effect of synergy on export sophistication, holding the square of synergy 
constant. Instead, the key of a quadratic model is that the partial effect of 
synergy depends on the value of synergy itself. Imagine the ‘average’ country 
in the sample with a synergy score of 51. Under Model (1), a 10-unit increase 
in synergy to 61 – that is roughly a jump from Malaysia, Ukraine or Uruguay 
to Austria or UK – is associated with 18.3% increase in the level of export 
sophistication. The actual impact of this jump in synergy should be more 
impressive since the model is estimated using the full sample, which consists 
of both developing and developed countries. The presence of developed 
countries in the sample supposedly suppresses the curvature of the curve as 
there is not much variation in the export products of these countries.  
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Though Model (1) provides supportive preliminary evidence to the main 
hypothesis, it is too parsimonious to be trusted for two reasons. First, it does 
not control for other factors which have been identified as powerful predictors 
of export sophistication. Second, the error structure of the model is too simple 
to account for the effects of unobserved variables. Model (2) addresses the 
first limitation by including the control variables and Model (3)-(5) deal with 
the second.  
Model (2) includes – in addition to synergy and its square term – a 
measure of economic development, country size, human capital and FDI 
inflow respectively. This model by and large confirms the findings of 
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) that other things being equal, richer, 
larger and more educated countries tend to export more sophisticated products. 
FDI inflow does not carry any statistical significance, suggesting that there is 
insufficient evidence that FDI has a direct impact on productivity of export 
sectors. An alternative explanation could be that the effect of FDI depends less 
on the amount than the type. Investments which aim to extract natural 
resources or exploit cheap labor may not contribute to higher productivity. A 
consequence of including the control variables in the regression is a significant 
increase in the R-squared, meaning that Model (2) fits the data much better 
than Model (1). The most important finding of this model is that both synergy 
and its square term retain their signs and statistical significance at the presence 
of the control variables. This result establishes the robustness of the threshold 
effect of synergy.  
Model (3) manipulates the error structure by adding in country-fixed 
effect and the result turns out to be what I both fear and hope. The good news 
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is that the hypothesized relationship between synergy and export 
sophistication is fully retained and remains evident in the model. However, the 
loss of statistical significance of the control variables and the drastic drop in 
the R-squared deserve our attention.  For the control variables, income and 
education lose their significance. Population remains significant but changes 
sign. Overall, the result indicates that once country-specific effects are 
accounted for, the relationships between economic fundamentals and export 
sophistication become indeterminate. As a result, the independent variables 
altogether only account for 10.7% of the variation in the dependent variable.  
This piece of evidence carries two pressing messages. First, researchers should 
be very cautious with or even reject the fundamentalist worldview. Good 
economic fundamentals do not automatically translate to higher productivity. 
A lot depends on how these resources are managed, distributed and used. 
Second, future research needs to search for more powerful and stable 
predictors of export sophistication. It is highly likely that productivity of 
export sectors is further complicated by international factors such as trade 
barriers and international conflicts, which deserve further study. This paper, I 
hope, represent a modest attempt in that direction. 
 Model (4) is the benchmark model specified earlier. This model 
attempts to capture the effect of time by including year dummies while 
retaining country fixed effect. Time effect captured by year dummies can be 
interpreted as common (random) shocks to all countries in a particular year. In 
Model (4), the same results are retained for synergy and its square term. GDP 
per capita regains its significance and has the expected sign. The remaining 
control variables do not carry any statistical significance. Overall, the 
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benchmark model suggest that once country and year specific effects are 
controlled for, only synergy and level of economic development have direct 
impacts on export sophistication. The increase in R squared to 0.34 from the 
previous model shows that Model (4) fits the data better than Model (3). 
Model (5) simply replaces year dummies in Model (4) with a linear time trend 
and the results need no further explanation.  
Though the quadratic model fits the data well and the square term of 
synergy can be included to model the type of non-linear relationship, 
polynomials may have some undesirable properties such as “undesirable peaks 
and valleys” and “the fit in one region of X can be greatly affected by data in 
other regions” (Harrell, 2001, p. 18). Harrell (2001) also considers 
polynomials inadequate fits for “threshold” effects. To address these concerns 
and to boost confidence in the results, I complement the quadratic model with 
the linear spline function. Spline functions are “piecewise polynomials within 
intervals of X that are connected across different intervals of X” (Harrell, 2001, 
p. 18). The endpoints of these intervals are known as knots. The number of 
knots on the x-axis should be informed by the theoretical argument. According 
to the main hypothesis of this thesis, there should be one knot on the x-axis 
denoting the synergy threshold γ. Thus, the function g in equation (3) should 
be specified as ߚଵݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ ൅ ߚଶሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ െ ߛሻ where 1 is the coefficient for 
synergy < γ and 2 is the coefficient for synergy ≥ γ. Given the hypothesis, we 
expect ఋሺா௑௉௒ሻఋሺ௦௬௡௘௥௚௬ሻ ൐ 0 if synergy ≥ γ and 0 otherwise.  
The strength of the linear spline function lies in that it is a more 
parsimonious model as it does not involve non-linear terms. However, a 
drawback of employing this method here is the arbitrary identification of γ. 
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The formal framework in the previous chapter argues the existence of a 
threshold, but this framework does not tell us where exactly the threshold is. 
Thus, we have no theoretical basis to pin down the exact position of the knot 
on the x-axis. In the empirical analysis below, I take γ to be 51, both the mean 
and the median of the synergy index. 
 
Table 3: Regression Analysis of Linear Spline Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS FE 
     
Synergy (.,51) 0.00583*** 5.74e-05 0.000734 -0.00378*** 
 (0.00214) (0.00161) (0.00155) (0.00113) 
Synergy (51,.) 0.0235*** 0.00711*** 0.00874*** -0.000552 
 (0.00220) (0.00176) (0.00170) (0.00130) 
Log (GDP per capita)  0.223*** 0.224*** 0.0946*** 
  (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0358) 
Log (Population)  0.0633*** 0.0663*** 0.0687 
  (0.00570) (0.00548) (0.0954) 
Human Capital  0.00361*** 0.00333*** 0.00256 
  (0.000879) (0.000843) (0.00366) 
FDI Inflow  0.00136 0.00180 -0.000499 
  (0.00129) (0.00128) (0.000484) 
Constant 9.080*** 6.223*** 6.215*** 7.639*** 
 (0.0966) (0.166) (0.165) (1.714) 
     
Time Effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 438 419 419 419 
R-squared 0.317 0.697 0.731 0.335 
Number of Countries    61 
 
Model (4) is estimated using country-fixed effect 
Year dummies are included in Model (3) and (4) 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 is essentially a replication of Table 2 for the linear spline model. 
Model (1) includes only the two intervals of synergy, levels of synergy below 
and 51 and those above 51. 11 Though both coefficients turn out to be positive 
and statistically significant, the coefficient for synergy above 51 is 
                                                            
11  In Table 3, Synergy(.,51) denotes the interval of synergy below 51 and Synergy(51,.) 
denotes the interval of synergy above 51.  
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substantively much larger, almost four times as large as the one for synergy 
below 51. The result indicates that synergy has a much more significant effect 
on export sophistication once the level of synergy exceeds the sample mean.  
In Model (2) I include all the control variables identified previously. As 
a result, the coefficient for synergy below 51 completely loses its statistical 
significance while the coefficient for synergy above 51 remains positive and 
highly significant. This evidence is highly supportive of the threshold effect of 
synergy. Furthermore, the coefficients for all the control variables are all 
comparable to those in the second column of Table 2. Model (3) captures time 
effect by including year dummies. All the results of Model (2) are fully 
retained in this model. Inclusion of year dummies also gives a moderate 
increase in the R-Squared from the previous model. We can infer from this 
model that other things being equal, a 10-point increase in the synergy index 
on average raises the log of EXPY by 8.74% once the level of synergy 
exceeds the sample mean. For levels of synergy below 51, the effect of 
synergy is neither statistically nor substantively significant. 
Model (4) is estimated using country-fixed effect and the results are 
somewhat puzzling. The coefficient for synergy below 51 turns negative and is 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient for synergy above 
51 becomes insignificant. This model is also marked by a drastic drop in the 
R-Squared from the previous model. It seems that the linear spline function 
works particularly well for pooled OLS models but not models with country 
fixed effect. A possible explanation is that the linear spline models are good at 
capturing long-run effect but not short-run effect. When we estimate time 
series cross sectional data with country and year fixed effect, the coefficient is 
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identified by the covariation between log(EXPY) and synergy as deviation 
from the country and year average. Thus, the coefficient reflects the within-
country effect that synergy has on export sophistication in year t, which is the 
short-run effect. In panel regression without country-fixed effect, such as 
Model (2) and (3), the effect is identified primarily from cross-country 
variation, which is more permanent, long-run effect. Thus, we can infer from 
the result that the threshold effect of synergy is more of a long-run effect. 
The disadvantage of using pooled OLS model without country-fixed 
effect, however, is obvious. It runs the risk of unobserved omitted variables 
such as countries’ history and geography. Furthermore, a major drawback of 
using the linear spline model in this case is the arbitrary identification of the 
knot (point of threshold).  In Section 4.6, I investigate the interactive effects of 
human capital and FDI, where the interaction term allows the synergy 
threshold to vary according to levels of human capital. This makes arbitrary 
identification of the threshold particularly unattractive. Finally, as Harrell 
(2001) contends, the linear spline is not smooth and do not fit curved functions 
well. For the abovementioned reasons, I will employ the quadratic model for 
the rest of the analysis. The baseline is to know that the linear spline model 
strongly supports the threshold effect of synergy under pooled OLS 
specifications.  
 
4.5 The Benchmark Model by Income Subgroups 
The models in Table 2 are estimated for the entire sample. However, though 
the threshold effect of synergy remains evident under all specifications, it may 
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not be a good assumption that the synergy index works in the same way for all 
countries for both theoretical and technical reasons. The game-theoretic model 
is based on the assumption that ݏ ∈ ݂ሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕሻ satisfies the Inada condition, 
which implies that synergy exhibits diminishing returns as its values get 
higher. Given the empirical fact that all advanced industrialized countries are 
blessed with above-threshold levels of synergy12, the threshold argument does 
not apply to this group of countries. In other words, if we run the benchmark 
model for the subsample of developed countries, the threshold effect would 
not be reflected in the result. Instead, we expect the regression to reflect 
diminishing returns to synergy under a quadratic specification. That is, for  
ߚଵݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ ൅ ߚଶݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕଶ , we now expect 1 > 0 and 2 < 0, meaning that 
export sophistication increases with synergy but at a decreasing rate.   
The second reason is technical. Since all developed countries tend to 
export products with similar levels of sophistication and their EXPY values 
are rather stable across the board and over time, there is less variation in the 
dependent variable for the subsample of developed countries. The standard 
deviation of EXPY for the OECD subsample is only 58% as large as that for 
the entire sample. Similarly, the benchmark model may perform poorly for the 
subsample of underdeveloped countries because there is simply no way for 
these countries to export sophisticated products, no matter how well the states 
and businesses could cooperate. Furthermore, researchers studying less 
developed countries generally face the difficulty posed by inaccurate 
measurement and missing data. In this case, unfortunately, the data for the 
                                                            
12 Using the coefficients derived from regression of Model (2) in Table 2, the model with the 
highest R-squared, the threshold level of synergy is calculated to be about 42. Most OECD 
countries in the sample, with the exception of Mexico, have synergy scores higher than 42.  
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lowest-income subsample is not complete enough to generate any meaningful 
result. Thus, I divide the entire sample into two subsamples by the level of 
per-capita GDP: OECD countries and middle-income countries. The latter is 
further divided into upper-middle and lower-middle groups. Overall, I expect 
the synergy threshold effect to be more evident among middle-income 
countries than among countries at the two ends of the income spectrum.  
 
Table 4: Regression of the Benchmark Model by Income Subgroups 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (EXPY) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OECD Middle-income Upper Middle Lower Middle 
     
Synergy 0.0108*** -0.0394*** -0.0297** 0.0522 
 (0.00311) (0.0143) (0.0117) (0.0427) 
Synergy2 -9.41e-05*** 0.000416** 0.000313** -0.000690 
 (2.41e-05) (0.000166) (0.000134) (0.000497) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.278*** 0.0208 0.181** -0.0810 
 (0.0314) (0.0779) (0.0710) (0.213) 
Log (Population) -0.290*** 0.0636 0.381** -0.148 
 (0.103) (0.257) (0.167) (0.966) 
Human Capital 0.0191*** 0.00245 0.00301 0.0330 
 (0.00252) (0.00773) (0.00472) (0.0417) 
FDI Inflow -0.000132 -0.0111*** -0.00530*** -0.0369*** 
 (0.000178) (0.00299) (0.00198) (0.00962) 
Constant 11.05*** 8.915* 2.066 11.08 
 (1.785) (4.636) (3.079) (18.12) 
     
Observations 223 184 119 65 
R-squared 0.852 0.295 0.619 0.440 
Number of countries 29 35 23 13 
 
Country-fixed effect and year dummies are included in all models 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model (1) in Table 4 estimates the benchmark model for the OECD subsample. 
Despite the concern that there is not enough variation in the dependent 
variable for this subsample, the coefficients of both synergy and its square 
term are highly significant and well reflect the diminishing return of synergy. 
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A positive linear term and a negative square term together mean that export 
sophistication initially rises rapidly with synergy but levels off as synergy gets 
higher. The coefficients of GDP per capita and human capital have the 
expected sign and are highly significant, suggesting that income and education 
have direct impacts on export sophistication in developed countries. This is 
not surprising because products exported by rich countries tend to be more 
knowledge and skill intensive. Therefore, the education level of the workforce 
plays an important role. Population, however, has an adverse impact on export 
sophistication and is statistically significant. This result is somewhat tricky 
and should be interpreted with great care. Product innovation and inventive 
activities in developed countries rely more on scientific research rather than 
experience-based trial and error. It would therefore make better sense if 
population has little effect on export sophistication in rich countries. A 
significantly negative coefficient in this regard is unfathomable and should be 
approached critically. Hence, I shall refrain from offering a causal explanation 
to this observation. It is worth pointing out that though this model fits the data 
well, the result is not what this paper tries to explain. In fact, if the entire 
sample only included OECD countries, it would suffer from severe selection 
bias. Readers are advised to take advanced industrialized countries as an 
exception to the explanatory framework and not to generalize this pattern to 
the rest of the sample.  
Model (2) is estimated using the subsample of middle-income countries. 
The result essentially carries the same information as Model (4) in Table 2 
(the benchmark model). The coefficients of synergy and the square term are 
significant and reflect the threshold effect of synergy. Excluding OECD 
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countries from the sample boosts the absolute values of the coefficients, 
meaning that the threshold effect is more evident among middle-income 
countries. Model (3) applies the same specification to the subsample of upper-
middle income countries. Based on the value of the R-squared, this model 
works particularly well for this category of countries. With country and year 
specific effect, not only is the threshold effect of synergy reflected in the result, 
but also GDP per capita and population have the expected signs and are 
significant at 5%. It suggests that Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik’s (2007) 
findings are more applicable to countries with upper-middle levels of 
economic development than the full sample. Model (4) is estimated using the 
subsample of lower-middle income countries. The data for this subsample 
suffers from various problems such as measurement error, small number of 
observations due to missing data and selection bias. As a result, the regression 
coefficients are not very informative and should not be used to make any 
inference.  
Interestingly, FDI inflow is negatively associated with export 
sophistication for all three subsamples of middle-income countries. However, 
it would be too simplistic to conclude that FDI has detrimental effects on 
middle-income countries’ export sectors. To make sense of the seemingly 
negative effect of FDI, we must first understand the nature of EXPY as a 
relative measure of a country’s export basket. FDI is intrinsically linked to 
global production network and product fragmentation. As technologies, 
knowledge and expertise diffuse from developed countries to less developed 
ones, more developing countries can now produce items that only advanced 
countries could produce in the past. As a result, products such as electronics 
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and semiconductors quickly move down the sophistication ladder because they 
are now considered ‘developing country’ rather than ‘developed country’ 
products. In other words, expansion of global production network exerts a 
downward pressure on EXPY and this is especially the case for middle-
income countries. As more foreign capital flows in, production of many 
sophisticated goods is also transferred to the less developed host countries, 
making the products ‘less sophisticated’ and the producing countries ‘less 
sophisticated’ exporters.  
Readers may point out that since synergy exhibits diminishing returns as 
reflected in the OECD subsample, a cubic model should be estimated instead 
of a quadratic model. I have attempted to estimate a cubic model for the entire 
sample by adding synergy3 to the benchmark specification and the coefficient 
of this term falls short of the conventional level of statistical significance by a 
small margin (p = 0.1009). I suppose that a cubic relationship may in fact exist 
but is not very well reflected in the data. Theoretically, such a relationship is 
very likely to arise as a result of the advanced industrialized countries, whose 
number is rather limited compared with the middle-income countries. Hence, 
the number of observations may not be enough to establish a statistically 
significant relationship. Technically, adding higher orders of synergy also 
involves a “trade-off between flexibility and statistical precision” (Stock and 
Watson, 2007, p. 266). Including the synergy3 term introduces more flexibility 
as the cubic model allows for two bends instead of one. At the same time, 
however, increasing the order of synergy brings higher multicollinearity, 
which enlarges the standard errors and makes the estimation less precise. In 
this regard, my choice of a quadratic model represents a middle way between 
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flexibility and precision. More importantly, the hypothesis I am testing here is 
the threshold effect of synergy, which does not necessitate the inclusion of the 
cubic term.  
To summarize, this section investigates how synergy affects export 
sophistication in countries with different levels of economic development. The 
results show that the hypothesized relationship enters most strongly in 
countries with middle to upper-middle levels of income. In the following 
section, I will explore the interactive effects of human capital and FDI, the two 
intervening variables in the Rodrik model. Though I have shown that synergy 
may work differently for different country groups, I shall use back the full 
sample for the analysis to maximize the number of observations and 
generalizability of the results. 
 
4.6 Interactive Effects of Human Capital and FDI  
The Rodrik model carries with it two intervening variables. The first one is the 
quality of labor force, or human capital stock. Recall that the competitiveness 
of the high-tech sector “depends on both the skill level of the workforce and 
on the range of domestically produced intermediate varieties” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 
7), as explained earlier. The second intervening variable is inflow of foreign 
capital. The Rodrik model is a static model, which does not allow for 
endogenous growth of capital within the economy. Thus, “the economy’s 
capital stock can be increased only by allowing inflows from abroad” (Rodrik, 
1996, p. 15). Inflow of foreign capital increases an economy’s capital labor 
ratio and raises real wages. When real wage reaches a certain level, the 
economy is ready to get out of the low-tech equilibrium. Therefore, a more 
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rigorous test of the mechanism illustrated in Figure 4 needs to take into 
consideration the interactive effects of human capital and FDI inflow. To be 
more specific, an above s* level of synergy will land a country on the 
cooperation path, but the final result of cooperation is contingent on the stock 
of human capital and inflow of foreign capital. In other words, according to 
this framework, productivity of the export sector is jointly determined by 
synergy, human capital and FDI. This section specifically tests the following 
two hypotheses.  
 
H1: Other things being equal, state-society synergy has a stronger 
effect on export sophistication in countries with higher stock 
of human capital.  
H2: Other things being equal, state-society synergy has a stronger 
effect on export sophistication in countries with higher inflow 
of foreign capital. 
 
To test H1, the econometric specification of function g() in 
equation (3) takes the form 
ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ	ܪݑ݉ܥܽ݌௜௧ሻݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ௜௧ ൅ ሺߚଷ ൅ ߚସܪݑ݉ܥܽ݌௜௧ሻݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ௜௧ଶ
൅ ࢼ࢐࢞࢏࢚ 
where xit is a vector of the control variables mentioned earlier. Regression 
result of the benchmark model has established that the collection of terms 
multiplying synergy is negative and that multiplying synergy2 is positive. The 
working hypothesis here further requires 2 > 0. The first term in the above 
expression allows for the basic idea of the Rodrik model that the effect of 
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synergy is contingent on human capital stock. An alternative interpretation of 
the same specification would be that the interaction between synergy and 
human capital allows the synergy threshold to vary with the level of human 
capital stock. The second term above specifies a moderated quadratic model 
by allowing the square term of synergy to be moderated by human capital 
stock. This specification allows for the possibility that human capital does not 
only change the synergy threshold, but also the curvature of the curve. The 
current theoretical framework does not allow me to hypothesize the sign and 
magnitude of 4, which may or may not be significant and may or may not be 
interesting. However, in case 4 is significantly different from zero, omission 
of the quadratic interaction term would forcefully impose the restriction 4=0, 
which may have severe consequences to the estimation of other coefficients. 
Therefore, I choose to estimate a more generalized model because in a 
multiple regression like this, if 4 is not correctly estimated, we are unlikely to 




Table 5: Regression Analysis of Interactive Effects of Human Capital and 
FDI 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (EXPY) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Synergy -0.0518*** -0.0117** -0.0561*** -0.0561*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00452) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Synergy2 0.000436*** 8.28e-05* 0.000466*** 0.000465*** 
 (0.000111) (4.51e-05) (0.000109) (0.000109) 
Synergy × Human Capital 0.00377***  0.00428*** 0.00432*** 
 (0.000853)  (0.000884) (0.000847) 
Synergy2 × Human Capital -3.18e-05***  -3.66e-05*** -3.69e-05*** 
 (7.99e-06)  (8.26e-06) (7.93e-06) 
Synergy × FDI  0.000857** 0.000299 0.000228*** 
  (0.000431) (0.000429) (5.79e-05) 
Synergy2 × FDI  -5.98e-06 -6.34e-07  
  (3.78e-06) (3.79e-06)  
Log (GDP per capita) 0.103*** 0.0865** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0356) (0.0346) (0.0345) 
Log (Population) 0.167* 0.0667 0.160* 0.159* 
 (0.0959) (0.0960) (0.0946) (0.0939) 
Human Capital -0.0996*** 0.00227 -0.113*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0225) (0.00360) (0.0233) (0.0223) 
FDI Inflow -0.000431 -0.0304** -0.0166 -0.0146*** 
 (0.000471) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.00364) 
Constant 7.108*** 7.938*** 7.386*** 7.415*** 
 (1.686) (1.725) (1.665) (1.653) 
     
Observations 419 419 419 419 
R-squared 0.383 0.359 0.410 0.410 
Number of countries 61 61 61 61 
 
Country-fixed effect and year dummies are included in all models 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model (1) in Table 5 estimates the above specification and tests H1. 
Though the coefficients of both synergy and its square term are consistent with 
those in the benchmark model in terms of sign and level of significance, these 
coefficients have a somewhat different interpretation under an interactive 
specification. Unlike the benchmark model, this model does not directly test 
the main hypothesis because, as can be seen from the econometric notation, 
coefficients 1 and 3 now capture the impact of synergy and its square term 
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on export sophistication when human capital is zero, not their impacts in 
general. This is exactly the issue highlighted by Braumoeller (2004). Since the 
interactive model dictates that the effects of synergy and synergy2 must be 
contingent upon the level of human capital, there is in fact no such thing as 
“their impacts in general”. The general message is that the coefficients of 
constitutive interaction terms cannot be interpreted in the same way as in the 
case of a strictly additive model (Braumoeller, 2004). Here, for example, 1 is 
statistically significant at 1% level. We can reasonably conclude that the null 
hypothesis 1 = 0 is rejected only when human capital stock is zero. The 
relationship may or may not hold at other levels of human capital. But the fact 
that 1=0 is rejected when Humcap = 0 is not meaningful at all because none 
of the 419 country-years in the sample has a human capital stock equals to 
zero.  
A positive and significant value of 2 is the key to establish H1, which 
turns out to be the case in the regression, suggesting that the effect of synergy 
is moderated by human capital in a positive way. 4, the coefficient of the 
quadratic interaction term is also significant but negative. The interpretation 
would be that human capital does not only influence the effect of synergy on 
export sophistication, but also the rate of change of that effect as 
݃ᇱᇱሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕሻ is now a function of human capital.13 In a nutshell, the effect of 
synergy increases with human capital at an increasing rate at low levels of 
human capital but increases at a decreasing rate at high levels of human capital. 
This evidence is consistent with the Rodrik model in that synergy and 
cooperation may not make much a difference when a country is endowed with 
                                                            
13 Given that ݃ᇱᇱሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕሻ ൌ 2ߚଷ ൅ 2ߚସܪݑ݉ܥܽ݌, ߚଷ ൐ 0 and ߚସ ൏ 0, we can see that 
limு௨௠஼௔௣→଴ ݃ᇱᇱሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕሻ ൐ 0 and limு௨௠஼௔௣→ஶ ݃ᇱᇱሺݏݕ݊݁ݎ݃ݕሻ ൏ 0.  
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sufficient amount of human capital. In contrast, the marginal effect of synergy 
is very significant in countries with low and intermediated levels of human 
capital. Thus, in these countries, synergy is a valuable asset for raising the 
productivity of export sectors.  
Model (2) applies the same logic to test H2 and the result is quite self-
explanatory. A positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term 
between synergy and FDI indicates that the effect of synergy is greater in 
countries with higher FDI inflow. Unlike the case of human capital, the 
coefficient for the quadratic interaction term (Synergy2 × FDI) does not carry 
any statistical significance. It is therefore less likely that the rate of change of 
the effect of synergy varies depending on the amount of FDI inflow. Based on 
the evidence, we can see that the difference between human capital and FDI is 
that a sufficiently high level of human capital reduces the role of synergy; 
whereas that is not the case for FDI. In other words, FDI alone cannot become 
a substitute of synergy, even if it is available in abundance. The role of FDI is 
limited to that of a moderator of synergy. The implication is that if a country 
solely relies on foreign investment to raise the economy’s productivity, it may 
fail to do so because there is insufficient evidence to suggest that FDI has an 
independent effect on sophistication level of export products.  
Model (3) and (4) combine Model (1) and (2) by including all the 
regressors, except that the term Synergy2 × FDI is excluded from Model (4) 
due to possible redundancy. The interactions between human capital and 
synergy and square of synergy need no further explanation as nothing changes 
in the result regarding these two terms. The interaction terms involving FDI 
deserve one additional comment. The coefficient of Synergy × FDI loses its 
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significance in Model (3) but turns out to be highly significant in Model (4) 
when Synergy2 × FDI is excluded. We should note that the magnitude of the 
coefficient is in fact larger in Model (3) than in Model (4). The loss of 
significance is therefore due to a much larger standard error, which is boosted 
by the inclusion of the redundant regressor Synergy2 × FDI and over-
specification of the model. Moving from Model (3) to Model (4) does not 
change the R-squared of the regression, but Model (4) fits the data better 
because the absolute value of the t-statistic of Synergy2 × FDI in Model (3) is 
0.167, which is much smaller than 1. As a result, removal of this term would 
increase the adjusted R squared. Overall, the results support the two 
hypotheses to a fairly large extent.  
 
 
4.7 Effects of Individual Components of Synergy 
I conclude this chapter by further exploring how the individual components of 
the synergy index relate to the level of export sophistication. Here, the 
formative nature of the index calls for a somewhat different strategy from the 
one that would have been adopted had the index been constructed from a 
reflective perspective. For a reflective index, all the indicators are the effects 
of the concept and therefore, are highly correlated. Thus, it is not desirable to 
include all the indicators in one regression because doing so would introduce 
tremendous multicollinearity and underestimate the independent effect of each 
individual component of the index. Furthermore, it is not necessary to include 
all the indicators because all of them are intended to capture the same 
underlying concept. As a result, a separate model should be estimated for each 
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indicator. However, for a formative index, the opposite is true. Since all the 
indicators of a formative index are exogenously determined, we do not expect 
them to be highly correlated with one another in general. More importantly, 
unlike the case of reflective indices, the full domain of the underlying concept 
is jointly captured by all the formative indicators. Hence, we need at least one 
model that includes all the different components of the index because omitting 
one component is omitting part of the concept. In the regression analysis, I 
first estimate a separate model for each component of synergy and then run 
another model that includes all the components as regressors. Given the 
previous result that human capital and FDI both have significant moderation 
effect, I will interact each individual component with human capital and FDI 
respectively. Readers are reminded to keep in mind the interpretation of lower-
order variables in multiplicative interaction models mentioned previously.  
Table 6 presents the regression results for the individual components of 
synergy moderated by human capital. The results provide strong support for 
the argument that each component of synergy independently has stronger 
effect on export sophistication in countries with higher human capital stock. 
Social capital is particularly interesting as both its square term and the 
interaction between its square term and human capital turn out to be 
significant.14  It is both theoretically plausible and empirically evident that 
social capital is the element that gives rise to the threshold effect of synergy. It 
is likely that countries well-endowed with social capital are more likely to opt 
for the cooperation path and the other three components of synergy determine 
the final result of cooperation.  
                                                            
14 I have tried the same quadratic specification for all other components of synergy, but none 




In Table 7 where the individual components are interacted with FDI 
inflow, the same results are retained for social capital. However, two of the 
five interaction terms - State Strength × FDI and Institution × FDI – fall short 
of the conventional level of statistical significance. This makes it less likely 
that state strength and institutional quality have independent and direct effects 
on export sophistication contingent on FDI. Future research could look deeper 
into the relationship between FDI and export sophistication.  
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Table 6: Regression Analysis of Individual Components of Synergy (Conditional on Human Capital) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (EXPY) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Social Capital (SC) -0.0124**    -0.0343*** 
 (0.00562)    (0.00866) 
SC2 0.000855***    0.00181*** 
 (0.000313)    (0.000597) 
SC × HC 0.000232    0.00170*** 
 (0.000319)    (0.000507) 
SC2 × HC -3.28e-05*    -9.79e-05*** 
 (1.88e-05)    (3.53e-05) 
State Strength  0.00591   -0.0123** 
  (0.00781)   (0.00572) 
State Strength × HC  -0.000677   0.000590* 
  (0.000454)   (0.000326) 
Institution   -0.00663***  -0.00940*** 
   (0.00237)  (0.00299) 
Institution × HC   0.000530**  0.000609** 
   (0.000260)  (0.000242) 
Equality    -0.00595 -0.0226*** 
    (0.00389) (0.00568) 
Equality × HC    0.000619** 0.00131*** 
    (0.000294) (0.000331) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.112*** 0.0825* 0.104** 0.124*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0496) (0.0506) (0.0447) (0.0378) 
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Table 6 Continued 
      
Log (Population) 0.348*** 0.334*** 0.394*** 0.400*** 0.138 
 (0.0796) (0.124) (0.106) (0.0977) (0.0981) 
Human Capital (HC) 0.000905 0.00447 -0.0112* -0.0123* -0.0379*** 
 (0.00164) (0.00667) (0.00675) (0.00694) (0.00907) 
FDI Inflow -0.000768 -0.000197 -0.000304 -0.000711 -0.000502 
 (0.000542) (0.000766) (0.000977) (0.000826) (0.000466) 
Constant 2.683* 3.197 2.073 1.803 6.673*** 
 (1.451) (2.236) (1.903) (1.768) (1.777) 
      
Observations 701 562 946 903 419 
R-squared 0.260 0.191 0.095 0.136 0.390 
Number of countries 71 88 106 103 61 
 
Country-fixed effect and year dummies are included in all models 






Table 7: Regression Analysis of Individual Components of Synergy (Conditional on FDI) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (EXPY) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Social Capital (SC) -0.0121***    -0.0184*** 
 (0.00381)    (0.00428) 
SC2 0.000638***    0.000716*** 
 (0.000193)    (0.000205) 
SC × FDI 0.000483    0.00126*** 
 (0.000435)    (0.000444) 
SC2 × FDI -2.85e-05    -4.98e-05*** 
 (1.86e-05)    (1.86e-05) 
State Strength  -0.00496   -0.00296 
  (0.00419)   (0.00325) 
State Strength × FDI  0.000274   0.000135 
  (0.000258)   (0.000244) 
Institution   -0.00279*  -0.00249** 
   (0.00158)  (0.00116) 
Institution × FDI   -0.000121  -7.51e-05 
   (0.000233)  (0.000179) 
Equality    -0.00136 -0.00463* 
    (0.00281) (0.00244) 
Equality × FDI    0.000400** 0.000774*** 
    (0.000201) (0.000201) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.100*** 0.0825* 0.101** 0.119*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0497) (0.0507) (0.0446) (0.0373) 
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Table 7 Continued 
      
Log (Population) 0.342*** 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.414*** 0.0697 
 (0.0793) (0.125) (0.102) (0.0984) (0.0971) 
Human Capital (HC) 0.00155 -0.000914 0.00155 0.00123 0.00167 
 (0.00143) (0.00582) (0.00263) (0.00226) (0.00351) 
FDI Inflow -0.00214 -0.00379 0.00263 -0.00818** -0.0203*** 
 (0.00163) (0.00342) (0.00561) (0.00386) (0.00475) 
Constant 2.883** 3.368 3.108* 1.528 7.412*** 
 (1.449) (2.243) (1.861) (1.778) (1.771) 
      
Observations 701 562 946 903 419 
R-squared 0.257 0.189 0.091 0.136 0.394 
Number of countries 71 88 106 103 61 
 
Country-fixed effect and year dummies are included in all models 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
While economic theories have argued that cooperation between state and 
businesses is desirable and in some cases, necessary for productivity gains, 
why does such cooperation fail to occur in some countries? My argument 
suggests that the answer lies in the fact that state-society synergy differs 
tremendously across countries. The game-theoretic model in Chapter 3 shows 
that cooperation can only occur after synergy reaches a certain threshold. Once 
countries land on the cooperation path, the Rodirk model is activated and their 
economies move to the high-tech equilibriums, leading to higher productivities 
of the export sectors. Thus, synergy favors export sophistication only in 
countries with above-threshold levels of synergy. Overall, the threshold effect 
of synergy is well reflected in the data. The hypothesized relationship certainly 
holds for the entire sample, but the subsample of (upper) middle income 
countries fit the model particularly well. The evidence also indicates that state-
society synergy has a stronger effect on export sophistication in countries with 
a higher human capital stock and higher net inflows of foreign capital, as 
implied by the Rodrik model.  
The conclusion of this thesis is not meant to provide specific policy 
prescription as it is difficult to manipulate a country’s stock of synergy in a 
short period of time. However, if countries are endowed with a substantial 
amount of synergy, they are blessed with a special form of capital for the 
development of new industries. It is these countries that may want to make use 
of the international market to boast the productivity of their export sectors. 
The fact that countries are better off by exporting rich country products 
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implies that for developing countries, neither specialization according to 
comparative advantage nor laissez-faire is a good policy option. Countries 
“specializing according to their comparative advantages can get stuck with 
low-income goods because entrepreneurship in cost discovery entails 
important externalities” (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007, p. 24). 
Conventional wisdom of economics calls for government intervention in the 
presence of externalities, both positive and negative. This research emphasizes 
that educated, informed and effective state-business cooperation is more likely 
if a synergetic relationship exist between state bureaucracies and civil society.  
Having said that, it is important not to overstretch the scope and 
implications of my research. First, despite the intrinsic links between my 
theoretical framework and the development literature, this research does not 
attempt to explain development. Such an attempt would require another big 
step in the causal chain and introduce a lot more intervening variables that 
need to be controlled for. Instead, my thesis has focuses on the productivity of 
export sectors, which may or may not lead to development eventually 
depending on many other factors.  
Second, this research is not about the developmental states in East Asia, 
which adopted the strategy of export-oriented industrialization. It is certainly 
true that the developmental states may bear certain features of state-society 
synergy such as robust bureaucratic structure. However, anyone familiar with 
the developmental states may point out that these states, especially in their 
early stages of industrialization, did not really have a synergetic state-society 
relationship (as conceptualized by Evans) due to lack of political competition 
and high degrees of inequality. In some sense, the developmental states are 
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outliers rather than subjects of the current theoretical framework. Spearheaded 
by Johnson’s (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, theories of 
developmental states are not causal theories per se. As Woo-Cumings (1999) 
notes, Johnson’s work is “not an analytic account in search of causal arrows”, 
rather it is a “historical account in search of meaning behind the actions of 
Japan’s policymakers” (p.2). Moreover, scholars of developmental states have 
often ignored the centrality of nationalism and social mobilization – the 
“exigencies and requirements of national survival and mobilization in a 
twentieth century dominated by bigger powers in Europe and America” (Woo-
Cumings, 1999, p. 2) – in industrial development of Northeast Asia. Readers 
may have noticed that the historical context of late development and the 
influences of nationalism and mobilization are completely missing from the 
current framework. Instead, I present in Chapter 3 a model in which state-
business cooperation is reached as a result of the actors’ independent rational 
choices under a specific cost-benefit structure.  
I conclude this thesis by suggesting three possible directions for future 
research. A limitation of the current theoretical framework is that for countries 
whose levels of synergy fall below the threshold, this research leaves their 
variations in export sophistication unexplained. The game-theoretic model 
suggests that strategic state-firm interaction cannot generate cooperation in 
countries with below-threshold levels of synergy and their productivity levels 
are likely to be determined by a different set of political economic dynamics. 
Future research may aim to discover these dynamics or put forward new 
variables that could overcome this limitation.  
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The synergy index constructed here can be potentially improved by 
assigning different weights to different indicator items instead of using an 
equally weighted linear composite. A weighted index is theoretically plausible 
as it is possible that some components are more important than others in 
creating a synergetic relationship between state and society. The problem, 
however, is technical. Even though a comprehensive survey of existing 
literatures could illuminate the relative importance of each individual 
component, we have no basis to conclude, for example, that social capital is 
twice as important as political competition for state-society synergy. It would 
be difficult to test such statements because state-society synergy itself is a 
latent variable, which is not directly observable and can only be inferred from 
other observed facts. Furthermore, it is also difficult to justify the time and 
resource spent just to figure out the weights of different items if in the end, the 
weighted index tells essentially the same empirical story. Alternatively, 
researchers may look for effect indicators of synergy and construct the index 
from a reflective perspective. A limitation of the formative approach is that 
conventional validity assessments such as factor analysis and assessment of 
internal consistency are not appropriate for composite variables with formative 
indicators (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001; Bollen, 1989) because of 
non-interchangeability and exogeneity of indicators.  
Last but not least, the effect of FDI on export sophistication should be 
further explored. The benchmark model indicates that there is no sufficient 
evidence to suggest a direct impact of FDI. Although the interaction between 
synergy and FDI is significant, the significant relationship does not hold for all 
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indicators of synergy. Given the fact that trade and FDI are the two pillars of 
globalization, the role of FDI certainly commands further research.  
We have entered the second decade of the 21st Century where 
globalization is intensifying every day in every way. Despite the emergence of 
backlashes against globalization, countries today have to take the global 
production network as a reality and try to make something positive out of it. 
That provides us with a good reason to focus on the sophistication of export 
sectors, which to a large extent determines how much a country benefits from 
globalization. In this regard, factors influencing the productivity of these 
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